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Chapter 1 
The Traditional Foreign Policy of the United states 
The memorable message which President Wilson addressed to 
the Extraordinary Session of Congress on April 2, 1917, advis-
lng a Declaration of War against the Imperial Government of 
Germany, stands as a landmark in the hlstory of the foreign 
policy of the United states. His action, arising from his 
conviction that the honor of the United states could be main-
tained only by actively espousing the cause of the Allies, 
marks a reversal Of the time-honored and cherished attltude 
of non-intervention which through the years had become an in-
tegral part Of oUr national llfe. So deep-rooted had become 
OUr acoeptanoe of the idea of isolation, that only eyents of 
the very gravest oharacter, reacting upon the oonviotions and 
emotions of the people as a whole, as well as upon their 
leader, would enable them to countenance SUch a break with 
tradition. 
Why was such a course possible? Why was the President 
a ble to lead ·the nation into war in spite of his earlier de-
termination to avoid foreign entanglements? The answers to 
these questions must be sought in the events and the diplo-
matio developments of the troublesome years of neutrality-
But before attempting to trace these foroes a brief consid-
~ 
--------------------------------------------, 
eration of the traditional foreign policy of the United states 
may lead to a better understanding of the signiticance.ot 
president Wilson's action. Moreover, as the declaration of 
war drew the United states into the closest co-operation with 
England, a survey ot the relations between these two countries 
during the previous century may not be amiss. 
The earliest policy of the United states was not one ot is-
olation. In their struggle for freedom the colonies sought 
and accepted toreign aid. But, although they welcomed the 
alliance with France in 1778, that same alliance later threat-
ened to draw the new republic into the maelstrom ot the Euro-
pean Wars. During her struggle with England the French Rev-
olutionarY Government attempted to secure the help ot the 
United states according to the terms ot this treaty. In 
this national crisis Washington, ,on April 22, 1793, issued 
his tamous proclamation ot neutrality in Which he pledged the 
United states to a " ••• conduct friendly and impartial to the 
1 
belligerent powers." 
His views on the proper relations ot this country with 
Europe were amplitied in his Farewell Address, september 17, 
1796, in which he advised that the United states in the tuture 
refrain from fOrming permanent alliances with any portion ot 
the rest of the world. Because ot our distant situation he 
1 
James D. Richardson, Compiler, A Compilation of the Messa~s 
and Papers ot the PreSidents, 10 V., New York, 1897, I, 1 8. 
,... 
-~----------------------------------~--------------------~ 
maintained such ties would be artificial and would serve mere-
ly to bring this country into controversies, the cause~of 
2 
which were not our concern. 
washington's injunction, reinforced by similar pronounc.~ 
ments by later presidents and statesmen, came to have in-
creased weight and significance. The issuariQe in 1823 of 
the Monroe Doctrine, which placed the principle of non-inter-
vention by Europe in American affairs side by side with the 
principle of American isolation from Europe, was the final 
bulwark which made these two principles an integral part of 
American policy. All through the nineteenth century the idea 
that the welfare of the nation was irrevocably bound up With 
the principle of the Monroe Doctrine was firmly adhered to by 
both statesman and citizen. Fears that American participa-
tion in international conferences WaS ushering in a new era in 
our foreign relations proved to be unfounded. On the occasion 
of signing the treaty drawn up at the Hague Peace Conference, 
the delegates did so with the reservation that no departure 
from the traditional policy of the United states should be 
inferred from any part of the treaty. Similar sentiments 
were expressed by the Senate in 1906 in ratifying the treaty 
drawn up at the Algeciras Conference. 
But While the United states adhered to the tradition of 
political isolation, her foreign policy has all through her 
2 
llli·, I, 215· 
history been influenced by the desire to extend her commerce 
with toreign countr1es. This has, necessarily, brougbt her 
into very close contact With Great Brltain, the leading co~ 
mercial nation ot the world. For many reasons such a rela-
tionship was lneVitable. England was the mother country from 
which to a large degree were der1 ved our language, our culture, 
and our inst1tutlons. From the very beginning the bulk ot our 
trade was With the Brltlsh Isles. Koreover, the Atlantlc 
ocean, which has been our chiet hlghway ot intercourse With the 
natlons ot the world, bas been dominated by the Brlt1sh Navy 
3 
and merchant marlne. 
This very closeness ot contact has resulted in many occa-
sions ot disagreement. The concluslon ot the War ot Independ-
ence lett many questlons stlll unsettled. Brlt1sh occupation 
ot the Northwest, debt disputes, and ditticultles over bounda-
ries served to keep alive teelings ot bltterness and resent-
mente The situatlon was further comp11cated by condltions ' 
in Europe growing out of the French Revolution. The out break 
ot war between France and England Ja9.rked the beginnlng of a 
struggle which in many ways was parallel to the perlod trom 
1914 to 1917. Trade, whlch bad been renewed after the Reva-
lutloDary War and was then thriving, became subject to restric-
tions imposed by both countries. Then as in the recent period, 
according to Moore, the Un1ted states was taced With the prob-
3 
John Holloday Latane, From Isolat10n to Leadership, New York, 
Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922, 100. 
lem ot deciding ..... how tar neutral powers are required to sub-
ordinate the interests ot their commerce to the hostiLt inter-
4 
ests ot belligerents. U 
The Treaty ot Ghent settled none ot the issues ot the War 
ot 1812. It did, however, pave the Vlay tor the settlement 
by diplomatic procedure ot some of the most vexing s~bJects 
ot controversy between the two countries. This method was 
particularly successtul in settling questions involving our 
northern boundaries and the tisheries. But in questions re-
lating to the treedom ot the seas it proved inettecti ve. As 
a consequence, thecontlict ot maritime interests remained 
for many years a potential source ot IrrItatIon between the 
two nations. 
Their tormal diplomatiC intercourse ~hows that the states-
men ot bOth countries were undoubtedly animated by a sincere 
desire to ettect harmonious relations. Nevertheless powertul 
int~rests and deep teelings in both countries were working 
1ncessantly in the oppOSite direction. The ~ailure to reach 
an agreement in matters respecting commerce and naVigation was 
attributed by Dunning to the very nature ot the problem. He 
said that it was " ••• inherent in the general condition ot 
world politics that America should be seeking new things and 
Great Britain should be standing by the old •••• The new comer 
among maritime powers tound herselt barred in every direction 
; 
John Bassett Moore, American Diplomacy, Its Spirit and 
AChievements, New Yort, Harper and Bros., 1905, 53.· 
5 
'trom profltable trade." The right of natlons to regulate 
commerce ln thelr, own lnterests bad hltherto been unqulstloned 
and the Amerlcan demand for freedom ot commerclal lntercourse 
was a departure from accepted ideas. 
Between 1815 and the Clvil War a number of dlsputes arose, 
a few of whlch, such as the Oregon questlon, were serious 
enough to threaten peaceful relations with England. In spite, 
however, of the bltterness in the United states that remalned 
as a legacy from the Revolution and the war of 1812, and in 
splte of the antl-Brltish influence exerted by large groups of 
Irlsh lmmigrants, the Government Was able to adjust by arbl-
tratlon all of lts ,dlfflculties with England durlng thls 
perlod. 
A fresh crlsls developed durlng the Clvll War. Brltlsh 
recognition of the Confederate states as a belllgerent aroused 
bltter protests in the North. The Trent Affalr brought the 
na tlons to the verge of war and revealed a curious reversal 
of their historic posltions, with the Unlted states Uphold1ng 
the right of search and seizure and Great Britain upholding 
the princ1ple ot the freedom of the seas. Relations were 
still further stralned by the controversy over the depreda-
tions of the Alabama. Continued refusal by the Br1tish Gov-
ernment to consider proposals for a settlement were countered 
by ant1-English measures in this country. An ind1cat1on of 
5 
W1ll1am Archlbald Dunnlng, nThe British Em~1re and the 
yrtited states, New York, Charles Scribne8s Sons, 1914, 39. 
P:= 6 
thiS waS the open encouragement glven to the Fenian Movement. 
Later a more concl1iatory splrlt on the part of Great Brlta1n 
led to the submisslon of the questlons in d1spute to an lnter-
natlonal board of arbltratlon. A judgment rendered ln favor 
of the United states was promptly pald by Great Britaln ln 
splte of the d1ssenting oplnlon ot the British member of the 
bOard.· Thls was the ]lost tamous case that had ever been sub-
m1tted to arbitration and 1ts successful adjustment " ••• en-
couraged the hope that the two great Engllsh-speaking peoples 
7 
would never agaln have to resort to arms. It 
A subsequent movement for a permanent treaty of arbltration 
which def1ni tely would suPplant war as a means of settllng 
future controversies was unsuccessful. This movement was the 
outcome of the settlement by arbltration of the friction which 
developed in 1895 over the Venezuela boundary. The tailure 
of the Senate to ratify such a treaty was a great disappoint-
ment to all friends of permanent peace. 
Great Brlta1n's taclt approval of the course of the Un1ted 
states in the Spanish-Amerlcan War dld much to foster the 
growth of a more friendly feeling. The cordial relatlons 
manifested during the early years of the twentieth century 
seemed to indicate that the two natlons were drawing closer 
6 
La. tane , 113 
7 
Ibid., 115 
together 1n sympathy and a sp1r1t ot co-operat1on. Dunn1ng 
attr1butes th1s to an "1nt1mate like-m.1ndedness" wh1ch;', he 
says, 1s an 1nd1spensable factor 1n 1nternational amity. On 
the eve ot the World War he expressed the op1nion that: "The 
whole trend ot modern development in c1vilizat1on is strongly 
toward the 1nd1spensable work1ng ot th1s tactor. Its intlu-
ence ls most marked, honever, where hlstorical ldentity of 
language and tradi tlon clears the way. The people of the 
Unlted States and Great Brltaln are drawlng nearer each 
other dally ln both the mater1al and splritual aspects ot 
8 llfe. tt 
8 
Dunnlng, 252. 
.' Chapter II 
The Problems of Neutrality 
In the years immediately preceding the World War many peo-
ple in the United states felt that we faced the dawn of an era 
of internaional co-operation and good will. In his Annual 
Message to Congress on December 2, 1913, President Wilson 
noted the " ••• many happy manifestations ••• of a growing cor-
diality and sense of a community of interest among the na-
tions, foreshadowing an age of settled peace and good will." 
This, he felt, would result in an ever-increasing willingne$s 
to " ••• bind themselves by solemn treaty to the processes of 
1 
peace, the processes of fair concession." In the United 
states, as in Europe, a movement for peace flourished. Just 
prior to the war peace societies had a phenomenal growth, 
2 
sixty-three organizations being devoted to the cause. These 
societies enjoyed the support of many of the most prominent 
business leaders, professional men and philanthropists in the 
country. President Wilson and Secretary of state William 
Jennings Bryan attested their devotion to the cause of peace 
1 
E.E.Robinson and V.J.West, The Foreign POliCa of foodrow Wilson, New York, MacMillan Company, 1917, ~3. ~ 
2 
Merle Cu~, Peace or War, The American Struggle, 1636-1936 
New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1936, 201. 
3 by joining the American Peace Society in 1913. The move-
ment was subsidized by wealthy men, notably Andrew Cartiegie, 
who endowed an organization designed to toster international 
peace. 
All of these dreams were shattered in the summer of 1914 
when most of the leading nations of Europe took up arms. 
Immediately upon the Outbreak of war President Wilson issued 
a formal proclamation of neutrality! which was repeated as 
successive nations entered the war. This proclamation was 
quite in keeping with his ideals of peace and his allegiance 
to the traditional American principle of isolation. "Amer-
ica, tt he said, "must live her own life- _ • free trom entangling 
5 
alliances." In a statement to the press, he expressed his 
determination to observe the strictest neutrality in every 
act ot the Government in order not to give the slightest 
6 
offense to anyone ot the powers involved. 
3 
Ibid., 200. 
4 
Supplement to the American Journal ot International taw, 
Di1lomatic Correspondence between the United States and Be Ii erent Governments Rel&tin to Neutral Ri ts and 
3 V., New York, Ba er Voorhis and Co-, 9 
110-114. 
5 
Ray Stannard Baker and Wtlliam Edward Dodd, Eds., The 
Public Papers ot Woodrow Wilson, New York, Harper and 
Brothers, 1915-1927, III, 101. 
6 
New York Tribune, August 4, 1914. 
The general reactlon or the people ot the Unlted States to 
the pre~ldentts actlon was aptly stated In an edltorlaf In the 
New york Trlbune: "Every American Is reflectlng these days 
u'Oon the Inestlmable value of our Isolatlon trom the armed 
camp. The neutrallty proclamatlon of Presldent Wllson Is the 
relteratlon of the pollcy of detachment whlch every Amerlcan 
schoolboy reads In Washington's words of far-seelng wlsdom 
7 
and whlch we shall forget to our sorrow. tt Two weeks later, 
on August 18, the Presldent Issued an Appeal ~ ~ Ameriean 
people asklng them to act and speak In the true splrlt ot 1~ 
8 
partlallty and frlendllness to all concerned. He reallzed 
that the cltlzens of the Unlted States traced thelr raclal 
orlglns to many countrles, partlcularly to those at war, and 
that consequently the utmost extremes ot s1D'1pathy would be 
natural and 1nevitable.He, therefore, warned them agalnst 
what he called the " ••• the deepest, most subtle, most essen-
tlal breach ot neutrallty ••• whlch would sprlng from passlon-
ate partlsanshlp." 
The extent to whlch elther the cltlzens or thelr leaders 
could contorm to thls lotty Ideal ot remalnlng Impartlal I'n 
thought as In actlon, Is certalnly a matter tor debate. An 
exact evaluatlon ot publlc oplnlon Is dlfflcult, If not ab-
7 
New York Trlbune, August 5, 1914. 
8 
~merlcan Journal of Internatlonal Law, IX, 199. 
solutely 1mpossible, due part1ally to the complex1tT of our 
racial structure, the var1at1on of economic and eultu.r4l 1n-
terests from section to sect1on, and to the inart1culateness 
of large groups of the people • Generalizations, therefore, 
. are dangerous but for the most part historians are ot the 
op1nion that the dominant feeling in the East, where the 
bonds with England had always been the strongest, favored 
the Allles and that farther from the se~coast the enthuslasm 
9 
for the Allies decreased. In this conneetlon, seymour 
stated that British and French sympathizers made little pro-
gress in the Jl1ddle West and the West and that GerBlB.n sym-
pathlzers made none in the East. 
The attltude of the press was, generally speaking, more 
favorable to the Allied than to the German cause. This was 
due in part to a lack of sympathy with what was c.ns1dered 
the extremely m11lta~stic policy of the German Government, 
but more part1cularly to the violat1on by that government of 
the neutra11ty of Belglum. Promlnent citizens of German ex-
traction and German newspapers and soc1et1es protested against 
the unfa1r treatment they telt they were receiv1ng from the 
10 
newspape~s ot the country. In defense of their posit1on 
9 
Charles Seymour, American Neutrality,' 1914-1917, New Haven 
Yale Un1vers1ty Press, 1935, 147. 
10 . 
"Blaming Germany for the War", L1terary Digest, v. 49, 293-
294, August 22, 1914. 
,.... 
~----------------------~----~ 
many editorial writers made that distinction, which was to be-
.' come so familiar during the course ot the war, between the 
German people, whom they highly honored, and the German Gov-
ernment. In spite, however, of the natural sympathy shown . 
to one side or the other, it was undoubtedly true that the 
majority ot American citizens telt that the war was a strictly 
European affair and could not affect us. 
The maintenance ot a strict neutrality presented problems 
of increasing complexity as the war progressed. Neither our 
isolated position nor our freedom from entangling alliances 
was sufficient to keep us from becoming Involved In the In-
tricacies of the conflict. That this became evident ImmedI-
ately was evIdenced by edItorIal comment throughout the coun-
try. In the fIrst few weeks ot the war the statement was made 
in the .-Ba=l..;;;,t.-1m;;;;;o.;;;..;;..re,. !!.!!. that complIcatIons were bound to ens:ue, 
" ••• for our relations wIth each country, if advantageous to 
her, are as distastetul to her enemies." Prophetically, it 
continued " ••• we must expect attempts at abuse of our neutral-
ity, and we must fIght as desperately to guard It against the 
slightest infraction, intentional or otherwIse, while still 
offering to each of the warrIng powers the hospItable consid-
11 
eration ot a friendly natIon." Similar vIews were ex-
pressed In the St. Louis Democrat which warned the nation that 
11 
Editorial Comment from the Baltimore News, quoted in the 
Literary DIgest, V. 49, 292, August 22, 1914. 
a mere declaration of neutrality, issued in a spir1t of fr1end-
.' l1ness toward all belligerents oould not safeguard the country 
against dangers resulting from oontinued hostilities. The 
desperat10n of the oombatants, the 1nev1table reSult of a 
p~olonged war, would impel them to make se1~ures on land Or 
sea, either for po1nts of tactical advantage Or for art1cles 
11sted as contraband. Any of these acts in v101ation of the 
r1ghts of the Un1ted states might eas11y lead to comp11cat1ons 
12 
w1th one or more of the warr1ng powers. 
These prophecies proved to be extremely aocurate. Quite 
early in the war, 1t became olear that a major portion of the 
attent10n of the bel11gerents was to be concentrated upon the 
effort to get oontrol of the sea. Continuance of oommercial 
relat10ns w1th the rest ot the world was essent1al to the wel-
fare of both sides. For many months after the opening of hos-
t111ties the Al11ed nat10ns were torced to depend upon the 
Un1ted states for a great portion of their munitions. Later, 
when the war became a protracted struggle, they looked to this 
countJlY as an important source of food, raw mter1als and cre-
13 
dit. On the other hand, the Central powers were, at least 
12 
13 
Editorial Comment from the st. Louis Demoorat, quoted by 
the Literary D1gest, v. 49', 292, Aug. 22, 1914. 
Charles Seymour, American Diplomaci During the World War, 
Balt1more, John Hopk1ns Press, 193 , 9. 
during the first years of the war, fairly self-sufficient in 
., 
the matter of munitions but were greatly in need of raw mater-
ials and food. It was quite eVident, therefore, that without 
access to the world's markets, neither 8~de could hope for 
succes s in a prolonged war. 
In any struggle for command of the seas the United states 
has inevitably become involved. Now, as in the period pre-
ceding the War of 1812, she became the champion of the doc-
trine of the freedom of the seas. She thus came into direct 
conflict with Great Britain who adhered to the doctrine of the 
command of the seas. The pOSitions assumed by the two na-
tions were consistent with the general tone of the1r national 
policy for, as stated by Kenworthy and Young, t'Command of the 
Seas has been the Pallad1um of the British Since the 1nstitu-
tion of the United K1ngdom. Freedom 0 f the Sea s ba s been the 
Palladium of the Americans since the independence of the 
14 
Un1ted States." In essence, the difference between these 
two doctrines was the d1fference between the rights of bel11-
gerents and the rights of' neutrals. Great Britain claimed 
the right to command the seas on the ground that her very ex-
istence was dependent upon keeping open the channels of inter-
nal communication. But inasmuch as these channels coincided 
14 
Joseph w. Kenworthy and George Young, Freedom of the Seas, 
New York, Liveright, 1929, 15. 
wi th the great highways of interns. tional trade, thelr control 
by one nation was almost certaln to result in restrtcttons 
upon the free intercourse of other nat1ons. 
The h1story of Br1tish seapower reveals that it has not 
been based upon the sanctity of any cod1f1ed or customary 
. law. A study ot their actual pract1ce 1n warfare shows 
little considerat1on tor the rights ot neutrals or the re-
spons1bili t1es ot b elllgerents. Lloyd George just1fles 
this att1tude by saylng that: "Nations tight1ng for thelr 
. 15 
l1ves cannot always pause to observe punctlllos." The 
keynote of the Brltlsh polley in the World War was ex-
pressed by the Pr1me Minister, Mr. Asquith, in an Address to 
the House of Commons in which he said; ..... we are not going 
to allow our eftorts to be strangled in a network ot jurid-
ical nlceties ••• under exist1ng cond1tions there 1s no torm 
of econom1c pressure to whlch we do not cons1der ourselves 
16 
ent1tled to resort." 
The last 1mportant effort to regulate maritime relations 
was made 1n 1909 when the ten leading marit1me nat10ns held 
15 
16 
Dav1d Lloyd George, war Memoirs, 2 V., Boston, Little, 
Brown and Company, 1933, II, 111. 
Quoted by Kenworthy abd Young, 27. 
a conference in London. The idea underlying the negotiations 
.. 
1f8,S the same that had been the basis of the Amerlcan posltion 
all through the hlstOry of the natlon, namely that the rlghts 
of neutrals should be determlned by a power greater than the· 
11 
w1ll of any single belligerent. The Declaratlon drawn up 
by the Conference was an attempt to clarify naval practice 
and to embody it ln a set of accepted rules. Among other 
things, lt valldated the 1nterpretatlon of the doctrine of 
"contlnuous voyage" given by the Unlted state's during the 
Civll War, namely that the ultlmate destlnatlon of the goods 
must be taken lnto consideratlon. It also protected neutral 
commerce ~n condltional contraband when bound to neutral coun-
trles. Contraband was redeflned ln lts two categorles, abso- . 
lute and conditlonal. Absolute contraband was to consist of 
goods excluslvely used for war and destined for an:~nemy, even 
if passlng through a neutral country enroute. To thi s .lass 
of goods the rule ot ·continuous voyage~was to apply- Condi-
tlonal contraband conslsted of goods whlch mlght have a peace-
ful use but whlch were also susceptible of use ln war and,which 
were destined for the armed forces or a government department 
of a belllgerent state. To these goods the rule of ·contln-
uous voyage" did not apply. In other words conditlonal co~ 
traband comprised artlcles that'l.were used genemlly by clvillan 
populatlons as well as by armies and only when destlned for 
17 
Robinson and West, 45. 
18 
army use were they to be treated as contraband. 
In view of the fact that Great Brl taln had a vastly !\lper-
lor naval force, the Conference was somewhat ln the nature of 
an attempt to 11mlt her use of that power. As a result the 
ratlflcatlon of the Declaratlon of London was blocked by the 
. 
House of Lords. ,:j, .., For the same reason that made lt unaccep-
able to Great Brltaln, namely that lt was too favorable to 
neutral trade, lt won the favor of the',ierman Government. In 
the event of a future war the observance of the provlslons of 
the Declaratlon would enable Germany to draw upon adjacent 
neutrals for suPplles. Germany accordlngly embodlea lt In-
19 
tact ln her Prlze Law. It was ratlfied also by the Senate 
·of the United States but, when lt was rejected by Great Bri-
taln, the President wlthheld flnal ratificatlon, a course 
which was followed ~ the other governments. 
, 
When war broke out ln 1914, the Government of the Unlted 
states lnqulred whether the Brltlsh Government would be 11'111-
ing to agree that the laws of naval warfare as laid down by 
the De~laration of London should be appllcable durlng the 
present confllct, prov1dlng that t he Governments wlth whom 
Great Br1ta\n was at war also agreed. The commun1catlon 
18 ~ 
19 
Samuel Flagg Bemls, A Dlplomatlc H1story of the United 
States, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1936, 591. 
~., 589. 
.... , 
F ____ ~--------------------------------------------~ 
pointed out that an acceptance ot these rules would prevent 
grave misunderstandings whlch might arise as to the re~tlo.ns 
20 
between the neutral powers and the belllgerents. The Bri-
tish Forelgn Mlnister replied that the Government'had decided 
to adopt generally the rules ot the Declaration tI ••• subJect 
to certain moditications and additlons which they judge indls-
. 21 
pensable to the etticient aDnduct ot their naval operations! 
The retusal ot th~ British Government to accept the Dec~ra~ 
tion ot London without moditication prompted the United States 
to w1thdraw the proposal tor 1ts adoption as a temporary code 
ot naval wartare to be observed by be1llgerents and neutrals 
during the war. Lacking such a code the Government stated 
its intention to insist that the rights and duties ot the 
United states and its citlzens were to be detlned by the ex-
isting rules ot international law and the eXisting treatles. 
It also reserved the right to protest each violation ot its 
22 
rights. 
20 
21 
Untrammeled, there tore , by the Declaration ot London, Great 
secretary ot state Bryan to Ambassador W. H. page, Aug. 6, 
1914, American Journal &t Internatlonal Law, IX, 1. 
M1nister ot Fore1gn Attairs Grey to Ambassldor W. H. Page, 
Aug. 22, 1914, ~ •• IX. 3. 
22 
Acting secretary ot state Lansing to Ambassador W. H. Page, 
Oct. 22, 1914, Ibid., IX, 1. 
~~--------------------------------------I 
Britain at the very outset of the war and by the magnitude of 
her shipping was able to assume oommand of the seas. 4fIer 
polioy and that of her Allies was to keep the seas open for 
her own commerce and to close them absolutely to that of her 
enemies. German merchant ships were driven from the seas 
and the German navy rendered ineffeotive. Because of the 
infer10rity of her naval power, Germany was not able to con-
test the Al11ed control of the seas but attempted by various 
means to destroy the commerce of Great Britain. Her prin-
cipal weapons of retaliation were mines and submarine attacks 
upon commerce and the coast towns. Both nations were ac-
tuated in this struggle by the desire to defeat the enemy by 
economic strangulat10n and starvat10n and both d1sregarded 
the princ1ples of internat10nal law when they threatel\ed ,to 
interfere w1th the nat10nal policy. The use of the submarine 
by Germany to destroy on the high seas merchant sh1ps coming 
to the Br1tish Isles, w1thout exam1nation or warn1ng, was 
23 
clearly a violation of accepted internat10nal practice. 
On the other hand Great Br1t8in placed her ohief reliance 
upon a blookade of German ports. But a olose blookade was 
not possible beoause of the mines placed by Germany 1n the 
waters adjacent to her shores, and consequently the Br1tish 
procedure could not, aocording to American lawyers, be called 
23 
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a blockade and was contrary to international law. 
The only restraining influence in the conduct of sudh a 
campaign lay in the possible effect upon the neutral powers 
and, particularly, upon the greatest of the neutrals, the 
united states. Neutral rights were constantly endangered 
and the extent of the respect paid to them depended, not on 
the rules of international law, but on the fear of neutral 
25 
intervention. Too flagrant a violation of American rights 
might lead to an embargo upon exports Which would have proved 
disastrous to the Allies. Without the BaW mater1als and the 
munit10ns wh1ch they could secure'only from the United states, 
26 
they could not carryon the war. But wh1le a general em-
bargo would seem to be an effective method of compelling ob-
servance of our neutral rights, 1ts use would in turn create 
ser10us problems. In the first place, the proolamation of 
neutrality bad stated that all persons Within the country had 
the right to manufacture and sell arms. Th1s was according 
to custom, there being no precedent to the contrary in inter-
national conflicts. Interference with suoh sales might, 
therefore, be regarded as an unfriendly aot by, the government 
seeking to purohase. 
24 
Seoondly, an embargo would oertainly 
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bave precipitated an acute economic crisis. At the outset of 
the war the United states seemed to be on the verge of~n in-
dustrial depression. Curtailment, therefore, of the prosper-
ity induced by the war orders of the Allies might have proved 
not only an economic calamity but disastrous to the Democratic 
party. 
other factors which, without a doubt, rendered the mainteJ--
nance of strict neutrality more complicated were the personal 
views of the President and his advisers in resard. to the re-
spective merits of the war aims of the belligerents. To de-
termine the personal feelings of the President was a matter of 
some difficw ty. He was a man of scholarly and retiring 
habits and his natural tendency toward seclusion was intensi-
fied'by the death of his wife a few weeks after the opening 
of the war. The evidence upon which to base an evaluation 
of his attitude must, therefore, be gathered ,from several 
sources. The first of these will necessarily be the diplo-
matic intercourse with the belligerents during this period. 
Seymour, whose close association with Colonel House would 
seem to give some weight to his opinion, says that the diplo-
macy of the United States at this time was the diplomacy of 
27 
the President. This opinion is supported by that of a 
member of the Cabinet who said that the President's conduct 
at the Cabinet meetings, immediately after his inauguration, 
27 
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1ndicated that he was going to be his own Secretary of state. 
La ter this same man denied the charge that the Ad.min1st1'-a tion 
was too Bryanlstio by saying that the "president was doing the 
29 
leading and Bryan the following. 
~ 
A ~ique feature of the diplomacy of this period was that 
much of it was oarried on outside of the regular diplomatic 
channels. The agent through whom these negotiations were 
oonducted was the President's olosest friend and trusted ad-. 
v1ser, Colonel House. House was perhaps mOre familiar with 
the President's ideas and react10ns in regard to the European 
situation than any other person, and the frank and personal 
charaoter of their oorrespondence makes it the most valuable 
source of informat1on though, unforttmately, a great many of 
the letters are not yet generally available. Finally we may 
learn something of Wilson's tee11ngs trom a study ot the 1m-
press10ns received by the statesmen with whom he was, nec-
essarily, in very olose touoh. 
Aocord1ng to Colonel House, the personal sympathy of the 
30 
President was, from the very beginning, with the Allies. 
Nevertheless, he insisted that his personal convictions should 
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not affect his political attitude which was to be one of the 
strictest neutrality. His greatest desire was to be t~e in-
strument through which peace could be restored. He also 
shared the opinion of the majority of Americans that the war 
was a distant event in which we could not and should not be-
come involved. An exceedingly interesting sidelight on the 
President's attitude at this time is found in the Diary of 
Colonel House. An entry of August 30, 1914, says: 
I was interested to hear him express as his 
opinion what I had written him some time be-
fore in one of my letters, to the effect that 
if Germany won it would change the course of 
our civilization, and make the united states 
a military nation ••• I found him as unsympa-
thetic with the German attitude as the rest 
of America. He goes even further than I in 
his condemnation of Germany's part in this 
war, and almost allows his feeling to include 
the German people as a whole rather than the 
leaders alone. He said German philosophy 
was essent1ally selfish and lacking in spir-
i tuali ty. 31 . 
The belief that the general feeling in the country was pre-
dOminantly friendly toward England and hostile to Germany WaS 
also expressed by Theodore Roosevelt in a letter to the Br1-
32 
tish Ambassador at Washington. This he attributed to the 
consistent policy of friendliness manifested by England for 
several decades and the unfriend11ness of Germany, particularly 
during our trouble with Spain. When comminicating this com-
31 
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ment to his government the Ambassador indicated that it was 
in conformitY with his own observations. He also added that 
the entire state Department was on the side of the Allies 
except Bryan. This statement was correct at least in regard 
to the Assistant secretary of state, Robert Lansing, who was 
. 
convinced that sooner or later the rihrted states would be 
33 
forced to enter the war on the side of the Allies. In 
this he differed radically from Bryan:hose greatest inter-
est was in the movement for peace. 
The British Ambassador felt that the President was in 
sympathy with their cause. In a letter to Grey he said: 
"The President will be with us by birth and upbringing but 
he is very much in the hands of our worst enemies and his 
name is Z9ther compromised by the Panama. affair. He Will 
have to be rather conspicuously neutral and that he is try-
; 
ing to be. Our line is to say that we are confident that 
he will favor neither one party nor the other and that all 
34 
we want is a fair field and no favors. It On another oc-
casion, in the course of an interview, Spring-Rice remarked 
on the similarity between the sentiments of Wilson and Grey, 
and he said It ••• there were tears in his eyes and I am sure 
• 
we can at the right moment depend on an understanding 
35 
heart. 
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The views of another English statesman, Lloyd George, were 
not, however, so optimistio. He felt that it was a mttter 
of great diffioulty to determine where President W11son's real 
sympathies lay. His deportment he desoribed as being so 
t·stuu.iously unpleasant" to both sides that eaoh suspeoted h1m 
of favoring the other. The English oondemned him for the 
severity of his Judgments on Allied aotivities " ••• not real-
, 
izltng that this was due to the fear lest his private sympa-
thies should peril the striot impartiality of attitude whioh 
36 " 
he was imposing on himself." The attitude of the people 
of Amerioa Lloyd George seems to have analyzed rather as-
tutely. While giving due oonsideration to the verdio. gen-
erally aocepted by England and Franoe, that" the predominating 
opinion in America was pro-Ally, he nevertheless realized 
that t here was a strong pro-German sentiment among the Ger-
mans of the Middle West and a "chronio hostllity" to England 
among the Irish-Americans. With a rare delicacy he reveals 
his understanding of the latter group. The former constitu-
ted a peaoeful, industrious and respeoted element in their 
oommun1ties whioh could not oonceivably be suspected of bar-
boring the tnhuman designs attri.buted to their raoe. More-
over, many of them wielded oonsiderable influenoe and they 
oommanded a number of votes whioh might be sufficient to de-
termine the issue in a oruoial eleotion. Weighing all the 
36 
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factors Inthe s1tuat1on, he reached the oonclus1on that In 
1914 op1n1on In the United states was ne1ther pro-Ally ~or 
pro-German but pro-Amer1can. If, 1n the ma1n, the general 
sympathy was wIth the Al11ed cause, 1t was not strong enough 
for them to endure wlth patlence losses or 1nconvenience to 
themselves or to Impose an obl,11gat1on to share 1n the con-
fllct. The ma1n Interest of Amer1ca was to malntaln her 
trade, her prest1ge, the securlty of her cltlzens and to keep 
her young men out of the shambles. ·She would be forced to 
flght only If flghtlng was better calculated to defend these 
37 
1nterests than neutrallty. 
The final problem of neutrallty to be consIdered here re-
sulted from the d1fferent vIews held by the opposIng sets of 
bellIgerents a s to the dutIes of a neutral. Th1s led to con-
troversles, based on the sentIment stated above, that any of 
our pract1ces wh1ch were advantageous to one country would be 
equally as distasteful to her enem1es. somethl~has been 
sald of the attltude of Great BrIta1n and our dIffIcultIes 
w1th her w1ll be treated 1n more deta1l later. But a word 
should be sald here In regard to the German attItude toward 
AmerIcan neutrallty. Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador 
at Wash1ngton, felt that at -the begInning of the European war 
the people of Amerioa were predIsposed to a feel1ng of sym-
pathy for the AllIes. Thls he atbrlbuted to several thIngs: 
37 
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the common l&nguage which opened the door to Engllsh political 
and cultural influences; the convictlon held by many tl!at Ger-
many was bent upon establlshing a world emplre; German attacks 
upon the Monroe Doctrlne and flnally the hostllity of the Im-
.per1al German Government to the efforts of the United states 
to br1ng about 1nternatlonal peace. But 1n sp1te of th1s , 
feeling, he felt that the general ind1fference that prevailed 
in re~rd to all that happened 1n Europe, together w1th the 
strong pac1fist fee11ng in the United states, would prevent 
intervent1on'ln the host1l1t1es unless provoked by unforeseen 
circumstances. The greatest potent1al danger to fr1endly 
relations between the two countries lay in the complete fail-
ure of the German government to understand the character of 
the American people. Bernstorff sald: "The American judges 
affa1rs in Europe partly from the standpo1nt of his own pri-
vate sentiment of justice and partly under the gu1dance of 
merely emotional values; but not, as was generally supposed 
in Germany, simply from a cold and businesslike point of view." 
This lack of understand1ng, he felt, was responsible for Ger-
many's complete inabi11ty to appreCiate the terrible effect 
upon publ1c op1nion of the invasion of Belg1um and the slnk-
ing of the Lus1tan1&.38 
.., 
Pres1dent Wilson's declarat10n of neutral1ty, which was 
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-supported by American public opinion, was looked upon with sus-
picion by the German Government. From the very beginn1ng the 
charge was 'made that American neutrality was tinged with sym-
pathy for the Allies. This was denied by the President who 
said that such an appearance was due to Great Britain's super-
ior, naval force Which the United states could not alter. This 
argument did not satisfy Germany who soon became convinced 
that the neutrality of the united states tt ••• was a mere hypo-
crisy, and that all kinds of pretexts were found for helping 
39 
England. tt 
The most perplexing of the problems which arose was that 
over the sale of munitions to the Allied Governments. In 
this case Bernstorff admitted that Germany bad no real legal 
40 
basis for complaint. The right of private individuals to 
make and sell munitions of war had been approve,d at the Hague 
Conference of 1907 at the suggestion Of the German delegate. 
Regardless, however, of the evident legalitY of the American 
position, the German Government continued to protest. They 
claimed that the munitions industry was delivering its wares 
only to the enemies of Germany and their theoretical readiness 
to do the same for Germany, if transportation was possible, 
did not alter the case. The claim wa s made tha t a real desire 
to maintain honorable neutrality would involve the prohibition 
39 
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of this one-Sided traffic. Intense bitterness of feeling was 
aroused 1n Germany over this issue. A vivid illustration of 
the prevalent hatred toward America is furnished by the 
Kaiser's refusal~ contrary to all diplomatic practice, to re-
ceive the American Ambassador. In answer to a protest in re-
gard to this unusual procedure he replied: ttl have nothing 
aga1nst Mr. Gerard personally but I 11'111 not see the Ambassa-
dor of a country which furnishes arms and ammunitions to the 
41 
enemies of Germany.·' 
The charges of .partiality made by Germany were echoed 1n a 
much milder form by the American Secretary of State. The 
question of foreign policy occasioned the first real disagree-
ment between him and the Chief Executive. Bryan took the po-
sition that all belligerents should receive exactly the same 
treatment from the Un1ted States. Germany~ 1n her submarine 
warfare~ was inhuman to the last degree but he felt that she 
was no more culpable than England who cut off food supplies 
from the women a.nd children of the Central powers. Both 
countries were violating OUr neutral rights and he warned 
that " ••• denunciation of one and s1lence for the other will 
42 
be construed by some as partiality. tt 
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Chapter III 
The Controversy over Ne~tral Rights 
The earliest and most continuous of the difficulties, which 
beset President Wilson in the maintenance of his policy of 
strict neutrality grew out of the interferenCe by the belli-
gerents with American shipping. By force of the circum-
stances which, quite early in the conflict, gave Great Britain 
control of the seas the major portion of the controversy was 
carried on with that government. Eecause of her naval super-
iority it was comparatively easy for Great Britain to stop all 
direct trade with Germany in artioles of absolute oontraband, 
that is, articles exclusively tor military use. The right ot 
seizure of this type of goods was so well recognized that very 
few complioations arose in oonnection with it. Moreover, the 
Allies were so inadequately prepared to produce munitions that 
they turnished a practically unlimited market for all that 
could be produced in the United states. Inability, therefore, 
to furnish these materials to the Central Powers produced no 
economio hardship on American manufaoturers. 
Conditional contraband, on the other hand, was a constant 
source of trouble. Allied control of the sea did not extend 
to the Baltic region and could not prevent German trade with 
the neighboring neutral states of sweden, Denmark and Holland. 
~e a consequence, the Brltlsh pollcy ln regard to condltlonal 
~ontraband. was formulated for the purpose of cuttlng ort every 
posslble souroe of German supplles. Great Brltaln's refusal 
~o aocept the Declaratlon of London wlthout modlfloatlon was 
(ollowed by Orders ln Counol1 extendlng the llsts of both ab-
. 1 
gO lute and oondltlonal contraband. Durlng the course of the 
~~r flfteen proclamatlons tor this purpose were made and the 
11.st Of contraband extended to lnclude two hundred and thlrty 
2 
a~tlcles- By Aprll 13, 1916 the 1lsts of absolute and con-
d1.tlonal contraband had been comblned as, ln the eyes of the 
B~ltlsh Government,the dlstlnctlon between the two olasses 
3 
hP-d ceased to have any value. 
Although each extenslon brought protests from those ln the 
u~lted states whose lnterests were affeoted, the general rlght 
ot a belllgerent to mOdlfy the 11sts of contraband was upheld 
b1 thls government. In reply to a letter from Senator Stone 
p~otestlng Great Brltaln's disregard of the deflnltions of con-
1 ~rltlsh Orders ln Councl1, Aug. 4, 1914; sept. 
oct. 29, 1914, Dec. 23, 1914; March 11, 1915-
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traband contained in the Declaration ot London, Bryan pOinted 
out that the Declaration ot London had not been adopted~and 
that there was no general agreement between nations as to the 
articles which were to be regarded as contraband. It was the 
practice of belligerents to decla~e the articles which would 
be considered as contraband and in this situation the r1ghts 
of belligerents and neutrals were inevitably opposed. He 
further stated that the record of the United states in the 
past had not been free from criticism. UWhen neutral this 
government has stood fora restr1cted list of absolute and 
conditional contra. ba.nd~ As a belligerent we have contended 
for a liberal list according,to our conceptions of the necess4-
4 
ties of the case." 
Nor had the united states any grounds for complaint in re-
gard to the Allies' application of the doctrine of "continuous 
voyage" to prevent passage of goods to Germany through neutral 
countr1es. In doing this, 'they were merely following the pre-
cedent set by the United states dur1ng the Civil War, when this 
country exercised the right to determine from circumstances 
whether the ostensible was the real destination. Because of 
the impl1cat1ons of' these earl1er poliCies, the Governaent of' 
the Un1ted States was not free to take action against all of 
4 
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the commercial restrictions wbich were causing inconvenience 
.. 
to the American people. They, as well as the Government, 
must re~lize that: It ••• some ot the doctrines which a.ppear to 
bear harshly upon neutrals at the present time are analagous 
to or outgrowths trom policies adopted by the United states 
when it was a belligerent. The government cannot, therefore, 
consistently protest against the application ot rules wh1ch 
it has lollowed in the past unless they have not been prac-
5 
ticed as heretofore. It 
The recognition of these principles did not, however, pre-
vent many serious conflicts between the two governments. 
As the war progressed, the methods employed by Great Britain 
in enforcing her naval policy, as well as her ever-widening 
interpretation of contraband, occasioned many protests from 
the American Government. very soon after the opening of the 
war, certain areas surrounding Germany and her Allies had been 
designated as "war zones" and had been made unnaVigable by 
means of fixed mines. This policy was explained as an act of 
retalia~ion against Germany tor having scattered floating 
mines in the path ot British commerce. Use of the North Sea 
was not forbid4en to neutral vessels, but they were warned to 
use the lanes of naVigation through these areas which were 
kept tree of mines by Brit1sh patrols. Th1s gave Great Bri-
tain absolute control over all trade with the Northern Euro-
5 
IBid., 5. 
pean neutrals and made it possible for British vessels to stop 
all neutral ships and take them into British ports for 1Jearch. 
On December 26, 1914, the Government of the United states 
made its flrst vigorous protest against the Lselzure on the 
hlgh se$S of a large number of vessels, laden with Amerlcan 
, . 
,10 .;., 
goods destined to neutral ports, and their retention in Brit-
ish ports for long periods of time. In this note the United 
States Government polnted out that pea,e, not war,was the nor-
mal relation between nations and that the commerce between 
countrles which are not belllgerents should not be lnterfered 
with by those at war unless such interference is manlfestly 
an imperatlve necesslty to protect their national safety, and 
then only to the extent that it ls a necesslty. The selzure 
of cargoes of foodstuffs and other articles which were admit-
tedly relative contraband, on the meresuspiclon that they 
were destined for an enemy of Great Brltaln, was condemned in 
the follOWing passage: 
6 
"In spite of the presumption of innocent use 
because destined to neutral territory, the 
British authorities have made these selzures 
and detentions wlthout, so far as we are in-
formed, being in possession of facts whlch 
warranted a reasonable bellef' that the ship-
mInts bad in reality a belligerent destina-
tion, as that term is used in internatlonal 
law. Mere susplcion is not evidence and 
doubts should be resolved in favor gf neu-
tral commerce and not against 1 t." 
Congressional Record, Lll, 1487-88. 
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The note finally complained of the injury to American commerce 
as a whole because ot the hazards of the enterprise an! t he re-
peated diversions of goods from long established markets. 
In answer to the protest of the United states, the British 
Foreign Minister expressed his Government's unwillingness to 
interfere with trade which was of a ttbona fide" neutral char-
acter. At the same time, he said the. t the Allies were con-
fronted with the growing danger that neutral countries con-
tiguous to the enemy would become abase of supplies for the 
armed torces ot the enemy and tor materials for manufacturing 
armament. In support ot this statement, he cited figures to 
show the tremendous increase ot exports, from the United 
states to the neutral countries ot North Europe, in November, 
7 
1914, over those ot November, 1913. The British Government 
felt that its national safety depended upon the interception 
of goods really destined for the enemy and refused to accede 
to the demands ot the United states that search for such goods 
should be made at sea and not 1n the ports ot one ot the bel11-
gerents. 
Thfs interchange ot notes was the beginning of a long and 
voiuminous correspondence Which cont1nued to the time that the 
Un1ted s~tes severed diplomatic relations with Germany. In 
this controversy, according to LanS1ng, every pr1nc1ple and 
7 
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rule of international law a.pplicable to naval warfare was 1n-
.. 
voked by one government or the other and became the subject of 
debate and argument. There was no definite code, no fixed 
standard, wh1ch could be applied. Everything seemed to be 
vague and uncertain by reason of the new conditiuns, though 
8 
the long recognized principles were in fact unaffected. -
As the British became more and more severe in dealing with 
ships and cargoes destined to neutral ports, from Which trans-
shipment to Germany was pOSSible, American shipp1ng and 1ndus-
trial interests became exceedingly 1rritated and indignant at 
the treatment they were receiving. They bombarded the De-
partment of state w1th compla1nts and demanded that the Gov-' 
ernment take steps to protect their rights and save them from 
9 
financial loss. Their dissatisfaction was aggravated by the 
grOWing suspicion that Great Britain was actuated by other mo-
tive. than merely the prevent10n of goods reaching Germany 
through neutral countr1es. American bus1ness interests were 
becoming convinced that, under the pretext of national necess-
10 
1ty, a definite effort was be1ng made to kill Amer1can trade. 
~he extent to which President Wilson was willing to accede 
to the demands of the commerc1al interests 1n his protests to 
Great Br1ta1n, seems t'o have been 11mited by his own personal 
8 LanAina, Mem01rs, 120. 
9IB1d., 121. 
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conv1ctions. Tumulty, who was intimately associated with the 
Pres1dent all through the war, 1s of the op1nion that odiy the 
be11ef that it was his duty to rule according to the will of 
the people kept h1m, after the violation of Belg1an neutral-
ity, from champion1ng thecause which he felt involved the c1vi-
. 
' . .., 
l1zation of the world. "It was his devotion to the idea of 
trusteesh1p that held him in check, and the consciousness that 
in carrying out that trusteesh1p he ha~. no right to permit his 
-. 11 
own pass10nate feelings to govern his public acts." A few 
weeks after the opening of host1l1ties, he stated" to Tumulty 
that the war would s.oon resolve itself 1nto a struggle between 
autocracy and democracy and that the Un1ted States could" not 
12 
remain isolated. When the off1cial action taken by the 
Government failed to satisfy the commerc1al interests and the 
German sympathizers, who were clamoring for a firmer and more 
dec1s1ve att1tude toward England, he refused to accede to thei~ 
demands. He charged that many of the senators and congressmen 
who were urging him to t.keradical act10n against England were 
merely try1ng to influence German votes 1n the1r districts and 
had no thought of the calamitous results of " a breach between 
England and ~he Un1ted States. He felt that he had gone the 
l1mit in pressing the claims of the Un1ted States but that ~ng- ' 
11 
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land, in the throes of 'a world crisis, must be given a chance 
to adjust these matters. Sir Edward Grey's contention -that 
England was fighting America's fight to save civilization was 
in accord with his own views as stated to Tumulty: 
ttEngland is fighting our fight and you may 
well understand that I shall not, in the 
present state of world affairs, place ob-
stacles in her way. Many of our critics 
suggest war With England in order to force 
reparation in these matters. War with Eng-
land would result in a German triumoh. No 
matter what may happen to me personally in 
the next election, I will not take aDY ac-
tion to embarass England ncin she is fight-
ing for her life and the life of the world. 
Let those who clamor for radical action 
against England understand this." 13 
~he President's determination not to precipitate a crisis 
with England was ably seconded by Lansing Who, first as Under-
Secretary and later as Secretary of state, was responsible for 
most of the notes sent to the belligerents. As previously 
stated, he early became convinced that ultimately the United 
States would intervene on the side of the Allies and he felt, 
therefore, that her differences with England must never reach 
a point where diplomatic correspondence would give place to 
action. Moreover, the United States ,must not enter the war 
too closely bound by what had been written beforehand. pre-
sumabl~when she became a partiCipant in the conflict, she 
would Wish to adopt many of the policies and practices a~inst 
which she was now protesting, for her aim then would be that of 
13 
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the Allies, namely to effect· the ,economio isolation of Ger--
many. Lansing stated that he never lost sight of this~posSi­
bility during the oontroversies conoerning the British re-
straints on our trade. His notes, therefore, became long 
and exhaustive treatises deSigned to open up new subjects for 
discussionrather than close those in controversy. Beoause 
short and decisive notes were dangerous, he worked with the 
deliberate purpose of keeping the controversy open and the 
questions unsettled, in order that the United States would be 
free to act, even illegally if necessary, when she -entered 
the war. The execution of this policy presented many diffi-
cult problems. On the one hand was the ever-increa.sing 
pressure from American bus1ness men, acting through their 
Senators and representat1ves and other officials, to do some-
thing drastic to relieve our commercial interests from Br1t-
ish interference. On the other hand, there was Lanslng's 
own conviction that, beca.use the United States would event-
ually be at war with Germany, its difficulties with E~land 
. 14 
must never be allowed to proceed to an open rupture. 
The policy of Wilson and the state Department in protest-
ing every violation of our neutral rights was vigorously op-
posed by the American Ambassador at London. During the 
entire period from 1914 to 1917, he was engaged 1n a campaign 
whlch he called atwaglng neutrality. tt His conception of the 
14 
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term was entirely at variance with that of President Wilson's 
and involved the maintenance of an outward neutrality a1id at 
the same time the exertion of pressure on Washington in behalf 
15 
of the Allies. He complained bitterly of the policy of the 
Government and characterized Lansing and the other members of 
.' '. 16 
the state Department as "library lawyers". He believed 
that the State Department had no conception of the real issue 
involved, that the Administration at W\Shington was not repre-
senting the ~al sentiments of the American people and that, 
for political reasons or through a false appreeiation of the 
vital interests at stake, it was sending unwarranted or at 
17 
least needless complaints and protests to London. The 
President was greatly irritated bY,the attitude of Page and 
asserted that if he were to represent the American Government. 
he must see the matters under discussion in the light in which' 
18 
they were seen in the United states. 
The Administration was fully as anxious as page at this time 
to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain but both the 
President and Colonel House felt that it was essential for the 
15 
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united States to assert her rights as a neutral. If she did 
not do this in the case of the seizure of oargoes she c~d not 
protest e ffeoti vely in case more serious attacks followed. 
House expressed to Page his conviotion that there could not be 
any serious trouble between England a.nd America, ..... with all 
of us feeling as we do; but of course we must needs be oareful 
in the manner of doing things - for the American people, as 
you know, are exceedingly sensitive regarding oertain ques-
~ions, and it would not be advisable for the President with 
19 
all his power and popularity to go counter to this sentiment. 
Unfortunately Page seemed unable to grasp the American 
pOint of view which Wilson was trying to uphold. His let-
ters reveal his frank admiration of the English system and 
from the very beginning of the war he urged Amerioan inter-
20 
vention on the side of the Allies. He had little sympathy 
with the preSident's refusal to reoognize the legality of the 
blookade. He was willing to make allowanoe for the British 
restrictions on trade and seemed to feel that, in oomparison 
with the defeat of Germany and the maintenance of good feel-
ing between Great Britain and "America, the losses and incon-
veniences of neutrals were of minor importance. The State 
Department felt that its work was constantly hampered by this 
19 
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attltude of the Ambassador. Mr. LansIng made t he apparent ly 
justIfIable oomplaint that Page: 
.' 
" ••• seemed to have so lIttle conoeption of the 
state of publIc opInIon In thIs oountry that 
he, doubtless wIthout realIzIng It, disoounted 
••• the Instruotions sent hIm by his own govern-
ment by showing his personal dIsapproval of them 
and by giving the Brltlsh offloials the impresslon 
that it was needless to pay serlous attentIon to 
the numerous co~lalnts whlch he was dlreoted to 
~y~~ret~~ a .. 
There oan be llttle doubt that Page's inslstence that the 
communloatlons of the state Department dld not represent the 
real Ane rloan sentlment, 1m s an lmportant faotor in stiffen-
ing the Brltish resistanoe to the American demands. But, at 
the same tIme, the BrItish Foreign Offioe was fully aware of 
the danger of pushlng the Unlted states too far. SIr Edward 
Grey reallzed tnem the beglnning the lmportanoe of the attl-
tude of the United States. He reasoned tba t by virtue of 1 ts 
large population and with resouroes greater than those of any 
other country, the United States could do whatever it felt to 
be right or desirable Without fear of the oonsequenoes. This 
country beoame, therefore, a faotor of such great importanoe 
that its attitude might bedeoisive in determIning the suooess 
22 
of either side. If Great Britain secured Amerioan sympathy 
and support she could win. The loss of that sympathy might 
even result in throwing Amerioan support to Germany and in-
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volve almost certaln defeat for the Allles. Thls convlctlon 
.' became the basls of Grey's pollcy and he was determlned to 
shape hls course so as to wln the support of the United states. 
The problems lnvolved are stated very clearly ln hls Memoirs: 
" ••• the blockade of Germany was essentlal to the 
Victory of the Allles, but the 111-19'111 of the 
Unlted States meant their certaln defeat. After 
Pa~ls had been saved by the battle of the Marne, 
the Allies could do no more than hold their own 
agalnst Germany; sometlmes they dld not even do 
that. Germany and Austria were self-supportlng 
in the huge supply of munltlons. The Allles 
soon became dependent tor an adequate suppl, 
upon the United States_ It we quarreled wlth 
the United States we could not get that 8~ply. 
It was better, therefore, to carryon the war 
wlthout blockade, if need be, than to incur a 
break with the Unlted States about contraband 
and thereby deprlve the Allles of the resources 
necessary to carryon the war at all or wlth 
any chance of success. The object of dlplo-
macy, therefore, was to secure the maxlmum ot 
blockade that could be enforced wlthout a rup-
ture with the Unlted states." 23 
Grey reallzed that the executlon ot thls polley placed 
Great Brltaln on very dellcate and debatable ground. Having 
superlor sea-power, she lnterpreted lnternatlonal law ln a 
manner tha.t would permlt the maxlmum of lnterference wlth 
goods destlned to the enemy. Thls lnvolved two steps: first, 
all articles that were essentlal to modern warfare mpat be 
made absolute contraband; second and more lmportant, the 
United States must accept the llst. Grey mentloned the 
Unlted States partlcularly because lt was the only neutral 
23 
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that could effectively d1spute the list and 1t was presumed 
that the other neutrals would accept any list that thi8e'coun-
try accepted. The att1tude of the United states, therefore, 
became of supreme 1mportance. She might reasonably be ex-
pected to dispute listing as contraband articles Which in 
previous times had been of little or no use to arm1es but 
were now essential to them. Inasmuch as these articles were 
of general use for ordinary commercial enterprises it was felt 
that they should not be put in the same class as munitions. 
To increase the possibil1ty of acceptance by the United 
States, the British Government decided to mak8 the list co~ 
paratively short at first and increase it as circumstances' 
24 
warranted. This extension of the list until it included 
some of the most important articles of American export, ac-
companied by an ever more severe control over trade with neu-
trals, formed the basis of the controversy which continued 
until our final break with Germany. 
In spite of the very eVident desire on both sides of the 
Atlantic to preserve amicable relations, by the spring of 1915 
the United States was becoming so irritated by Great Britain's 
high-handed interference with our neutral rights that affairs 
were rapidly approaching a crisis. This was averted only by 
a new development in the war which, for the time being at 
least, thrust our difficulties with England into the back-
24 
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ground. From the beg1nn1ng of the war Germany, due to the 
infer10r1ty of her surface sh1pp1ng, had placed her maiA re11-
anoe for 1njurfng thecanmeroe of the Allies upon the submar1ne. 
She now proposed to extend th1s polioy and render 1t more ef-
feative. Accord1ngly, on February 4, 1915, the German Ad-
miralty issued a proclamation declaring that the waters sur-
rounding Great Br1ta1n and Ireland would henceforth be com-
25 
prised within the seat of war. After February 18 the Ger-
man navy would endeavor to destroy all enemy merchant vessels 
found w1thin th1s area notw1thstanding the fact that this' 
pract1ce might involve the destruct10n of 11ves and property. 
Neutral nations were warned not to entrust passengers, car-
goes or crews to such vessels and neutral vessels were warned 
to steer clear of these waters. The German Navy bad rece1ved 
instruct10ns.to absta1n from all violence against neutral 
vessels but it was felt that the use of neutral flags by the 
bel11gerents might make it imposs1ble to prevent a neutral 
from becoming the vic.t1m of an a tta.ck intended for the enemy. 
Th1s proclamation injected a new element into.the s1tuation. 
Up to this time the quest10n involved had been the capture, 
retention and possible confiscation of vessels and cargoes. 
The new German po11cy meant their absolute destruction and an 
almost certa1n loss of life. These facts with their serious 
possibilit1es were called to the attention of the German Gov.-
25papers Relating to the Foreign Rela.tions of the Un1ted States 
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ernment. In a note dated February 10, 1915, the United States 
warned Germany that the destruction of Amerioan veasels·'or the 
loss of American lives would be considered an indefensible vio-
lation of neutral rights for whioh this Government would hold 
26 
Germany to striot acoountability- In the course of the sub-
sequent diplomatic interchange, the German Government announced 
that its new and drastio policy was a retaliatory measure and 
Was undertaken to break the British blockade upon foodstuffs 
27 
ana to cut off the British supply of munitions. In view of 
the emergency the United states proposed to both Governments 
a modus vivendi whioh, it frankly admitted, was based upon ex-
pedienoy rather than legal right. It proposed: the entry of 
foods to Germany, solely for the use of non-combatants; restric 
tions upon floating mines; the 'discontinuanoe of the use of neu-
tral flags by belligerent vessels; and that neither Germany 
nor Great Britain should use submarines to attack merchant ves-
28 
sels exoept to enforce the right of visit and aearoh. This 
proposal was aeoepted oonditionally by Germany but was refused 
29 
by Great Britain. Ambassador page, in a telegram to the 
Secretary ot state, described the English reaction to the ef-
forts of the United states. He stated that: tIThe feeling 
26 
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l 
in official and unofficial life is that our pacific intentions 
and our lack of appreciation of what the war means have·'led us 
to play into Germany's' hands. Whatever may be ,aaid or 
thought of this English opinion, it is clear that the British 
re~rd this move on our part as well-intentioned meddling and 
. '. 30 
it lessens their respect for our Judgment." 
The failure of this proposal was followed by a more ag-
gressive program on the part of both ~lligerents. Great 
Britain issued new Orders in Council which constituted in ef-
31 
fect a blockade of neutral ports. The United states denied 
the legality of these measures, maintaining that if carried 
into effect they would amount to a practical assertion of un-
limited belligerent rights over neutral commerce Within the 
Whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the 
32 
sovereign rights of na. tions now at peace. Irritating 
though this policy was, it was conducted without actual loss 
of vessels, cargoes, or passengers. In contrast, the activi-
ties of the German submarines seemed to violate all the princi-
ples of humanity. 
Within the next few months several American ships were sunk 
by German s"Ibmarines and a number of American lives were lost. 
30 .... 
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, 
popular feeling in the United states became tinged with bit-
terness toward Germany. English officials on the other hand, 
oonsidered that the German U .. boat oampaign was of the greatest 
assistance to their cause inasmuch as it turned American irri-
tation from the British naval policy to the German outrages. 
Moreover, the tension which now developed between the United 
Sta tes and Germany enabled England to increase the stringency 
of her blockade without straining her precarious relations 
33 
with the United States to the breaking polnt. 
The immediate danger of a quarrel with England was averted 
by the sinking, on May 7, 1915, of the Britlsh liner, ~­
tania, with a loss of one hundred twenty four Amer1can citi-
zens. Resentment against Germany became so intense as to 
bring in America the first general demand for war. The tone 
of the President's notes to Germany during the preceding 
months bad led many to believe that he would immediately adopt 
decisive measures. The German Ambassador felt that the force 
of public opinion and the hostility to Germany aroused by th1s 
disaster would force the President to break off diplomatic re-
lations. Such a course, he was convinced, would 1nevitably 
34-
lead to war. Wilson took no action, however, for a period of 
six days. During this time, Tumulty stated, his calmness in 
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~ 
the face of clamorous demands for war b~ught accusations of 
35 
heartlessness and indif.ference to the terrible tragedy ... 
But Wilson felt that his refusal to act hastily was Justified 
by the necessity of considering his first step in the most 
careful manner, for once having taken it he could not with-
draw. He again stressed his obligation to evaluate, to the 
best of his ability, the feeling of the country. He was 
uncertain whether the current emotionalism of the people would 
endure until a special session of Congress could be called 
upon to sustain any radical action he might take. His desire 
to act in conformity with the wi~l of the people he expressed 
in the following words: 
tiThe vastness of this country; its variegated 
elements; the conflicting cross currents of 
national fee11ngs bid us wait and w1thhold 
ourselves from hasty and precipitate action. 
When we move against Germany we must be cer-
tain that the whole country not only moves 
with us but is Willing to go forward to the 
end. I know that we shall be condemned for 
wa1ting, but in the last analysis, I am the 
trustee of this nation, and the cost of it 
all must be considered in the reckoning be-
fore we go forward. tt 36 
President Wilson's fear that public opinion would not sup-
port warlike measures was shared by Lansing. The intense ex-
citement of the East was not so evident in the Central and 
Western sections of the country. In these regions resentment 
35 
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1f8,S qualified by arguments in regard to the Wisdom of American 
travel on British vessels and the right of Germany to aQopt 
retaliatory measures against Great Britain. Jud.g1ng from the 
comments in the press LanSing concluded tba t public opinion 
was by no means unified but that the ue.Jority of the people 
37 
were opposed to measures tba t would lead to war. The prob-
able correctness of this conclusionwas verified by secretary 
of Agric~lture Houston who was traveling in the West at the 
time of the sinking of the Lusitania. He stated that to the 
people of the West the war seemed very far away and, although. 
they wanted the rights of the United States safeguarded, they 
did not seriously contemplate the possibility of becoming in-
38 
volved in the struggle. 
The long controversy between the United States and Germany 
Which followed the sinking of the !tusi tan1a cannot be treated 
adequately here. The limitations of this paper make impos-
sible any detailed discussion of the issues involved and hence 
only th9se aspects of' the case which bave a bearing upon Anglo-
American relations may be touched on. The first formal action 
taken by the United States took the form of a note of protest 
39 
sent to the German Government on May 13, 1915. The answer 
37 
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,-
to th1s note was so evaslve and unsat1sfaotory that Pres1dent 
Wilson felt that a more vigorous expression of the pos~tion of 
the United States was necessaFY'. Houston has given a very 
, 
detailed aooount of the Cabinet meeting of June 1, at whioh 
the President presented the draft of his reply to Qermany. 
Bryant s demand for a strong note to England also, protesting 
against her ille~l action in holding up our exports, was op-
posed by the other Cabinet members. They denounced the ldea 
that material interests should be considered during a dis-
oussion which involved so serious a matter as human lives. 
Bryan's oharges that the Cabinet was pro-Ally were denied by 
the President. He sald that the Unlted States bad sent a 
note to England and might do so again at the proper t1me, but 
that th1s was a s1ngularly 1nappropr1ate t1me to take up such 
a matter with her. In view of the ser10usness of the 1ssue 
w1th Germany, W1lson felt it would be folly to foroe matters 
. ~ . 
w1th England. seoretary of Commeroe Redfield pOinted out 
tha. t Bryan erred when he said that England had s topped our ex-
ports. F1gures were oi ted to show that the export trade of 
the Unlted States was greater than ever and was grow1ng. The 
praotically unanimous view of the other Cabinet members that 
Amerioan trade was flourishing 1n sp1te of Eng11sh regulat10ns, 
41 
failed to impress Bryan-
40 
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The final draft of the President's note called Germany's 
attention to the fact that the Government of the UnitedrStates 
was " ••• contending for something muoh greater than mere rights 
of property or privileges of commeroe. It 1s contending for 
nothing less high and sacred than the rights of hu.manity, 
which every Government honors itself in respecting and which 
no government is justified in resigning on behalf of those 
. 42 
under its care and authority." Bryan, who was opposed to 
the United States becoming a participant in the European 
struggle, resardless of the offenses, reSigned rather than 
43 
sign this note which he felt was only a Prelude to war. 
The unwillingness of Germany to reoognize the principles 
for which Wilson was contending served to keep the situation 
oritical all during the summer of 1915. A break with Ger-
many was avoided only because of the president's determination 
to first exhaust all possible means of reaching an understand-
ing. His efforts met with a degree of success althw:gh, in 
faot, the Lusitania case was never definitely settled and re-
maIned a dIsturbing element of our international relations 
all during our period of neutrality. The immediate contro-
versy was, however, terminated on September 1, by Germany's 
pledge that It ••• li.ners will not be sunk by our submarInes 
without warning and wIthout safety of the lives of noncombat-
42 
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ants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or otter 
44 
resistance. .' 
The failure ot the President to bre.ak otf relations with 
Germany was a bitter disappointment to Ambassador page. His 
letters during the summer and autumn ot 1915 were tull of com-
plaints in regard to the course adopted by the administration. 
He held that the practice of writing notes to the German Gov-
ernment instead of immediately dismissing its ambassador had 
resulted in a complete revulsion of English feeling towards 
the United States. The conviction was becoming general that 
the United States would submit to any indignity without re-
sentment and was pledged to a peac~ ~t any price policy. 
Writing to Colonel House, he stated empha~ically that 
1t ••• British opinion and the British.Government have abso-
lutely lost their respect tor us and their former high esti-
mate of the President. And that former respect is gone tor 
45 . 
good unless he acts now very quickly." 
House, on the other hand, defended the president's motives. 
He argued that the charge ot timidity was not justified be-
cause resistance to the popular excitement ot the East re-
quired an exceptional amount ot courage and subjected Wilson 
to many months ot deep anxiety and humiliation. His slowness 
to take deci.ive action and his willingness·to negotiate were 
44 
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slmply the result of hls unshakeable convlctlon that he was 
under obllgatlon to the American people to keep out of·the 
46 
war unless the Germans definitely forced it upon him. 
The Brltish Forelgn Offlce was a.pprised ot the views of the 
Presldent and the attitude of the American people by House. 
Shortly after the second Lusitania note he wrote that the vast 
majorlty of the people deslred the President to be flrm with 
J 47 I 
Germany but yet avold war. Some tlme later he reported 
that the sentlment of the country contlnued to be agalnst war 
and 1 t was doubtful whe.ther the presldent would be sust.,lned 
by Congress If he advocated drastie actlon. In thls sa.me 
letter he warned Grey that if the immedla te tension between 
Germany and the United States should be relieved, a demand 
for an adjustment of our shlpplng troubles wlth England would 
48 
lmmediately arise. Grey received a slmilar warning from 
the Britlsh Ambassador at Washlngton, who said that after the 
passlng of the German crlsis it would be the turn of the Al-
lles. In regard to the American note which was being sent 
he stated that tt ••• feeling in the Government clrcles seems to 
be that the Unlted states mu~t defend thelr rights and they 
must make a good showlng before Congress meets, but that the 
correspondence, should not take a hostlle character but should 
46 
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be in the nature of a juridical discussion." He also ad-
vised his government that inasmuch as England was usine(' this 
country as a base of supplies and had just floated a loan here 
it would probably be good policy, if not an absolute necessity, 
to make some concessions to American opinion • 
. 
,9 ., 
The note mentioned by Spring-Rice was sent on October 21, 
1915, and firmly stated the American objections to the restric-
tions of the Allies. Page complained.of its tone, saying 
that it contained " ••• not a courteous word, not a friendly 
phrase, nor a kindly turn, not an allusion even to an old ac-
quaintance, to say nothing of an old friendship, not a word of 
thanks for courtesies or favours done us, not a hint of sym-
pathy in the difficulties of the time. There is nothing in 
its tone to show that it came from an American to an English-
50 
man ••• " In spite of the firmness of the tone, however, 
; 
the note produced no change in Great Britain's policy. 
stated the English point of view in a letter to Colonel 
51 
Grey 
House. Compliance with the American demands would, in the 
eyes of the British Government, be tantamount to giving up, 
definitely and openly, any attempt to stop 'goods from entering 
,., 
Germany through neutral ports. The friction and trouble which 
• 
developed made Grey personally desire to give up the Whole~dea ' 
49 
Gwynn, II, 282. 
50 
Hendrick, II, 79. 
51 
Seymour, Intimate Papers, II, 79-80. 
. 
of blockade as practiced by Great BrItain but such a step 
would materially lessen the cha.nce of Allied success. ·'The 
real question, he felt, was not concerned with legal niceties 
about contraband, but was whether England could continue to 
use the weapon of sea power which the United States was noW 
threatening to strike from her hand. 
The persistent refusal of Great Britain to recognize the 
American position resulted in a change of opinion on the part 
of President Wilson. During the years 1915 and 1916 he grew 
more and more impatient With what he termed the "intolerable 
52 
conditionsot neutrality." The diplomatic surrender ot 
Germany in the cases of the Lusitania and the Sussex caused 
the attention ot the Administration to be concentrated upon 
our commercial troubles. Moreover, the cold reception given 
by England to his proposals tor peace apparently led Wilson 
to the conclusion that the war aims ot the Allies were as 
53 
selfish as those of Germany_ Spurred on by demands in 
Congress tor immediate and decisive pressure on the Allies, 
he instructed Colonel House to inform the British Foreign Of-
fice that the United states was faced with the necessity of 
taking some detinite action immediately. In his opinion 
52 
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only two courses were open to th1s country. The f1rst 'was to 
make a def1n1te move for peace upon some permanent bas1~ In 
the event of the fa1lure of this f1rst plan the United states 
would ins 1st to the 11mit upon her r1ghts of trade and upon 
the freedom of the seas as defined by 1nternat10nal law. If 
forced to th1s second course, the American position would be 
asserted with the same pla1n speaking and firmness that was 
54 
used against Germany. 
The reluctance of Great Britain to consider peace proposals 
at this time and her refusal to give up the blockade led Wil-
son to give serious cons1deration to the idea of imposing an 
embargo upon exports to the Al11ed countr1es. 'l'h1 s wa s gen-
erally recognized as ·the most effective weapon in the posses~ 
~on of the United states and its use at any time would have 
resulted in a complete change of policy on the part of Grea"t 
Britain. The reluctance of the President and his advisers to 
resort to 1t cannot be attributed ent1rely to their friendsh1p 
and sympathy with England which made them loath to hamper her 
effect1 veness against Germany. They were also acutely con-
sc10us at all times of the effect of such a step upon the eco-
nomic life of the nation. Commerc1ally we had always been 
bound more closely w1th England than with an, other country. 
Drastic act10n at this time, though it might accomp11sh its 
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immediate objeotive, would undoubtedly upset oommeroial rela-
tions between the two oountries for some time to oome.·House 
stresses this point in July, 1915, when he wrote to the Pres-
ident: "In regard. to our shipping troubles with Great Britain, 
I believe that if we press balM enough they will go to almost 
any length rather than oome to the breaking point. But, in 
so dOing, we would gain their eternal resentment for having 
taken advantage of their position and our aotion would arise 
to haunt us - not only at the peaoe oonferenoe but for a oen-
tury to follow ••• lf it oame to the last analysis and we plaoed 
an embargo upon munitions of war and foodstuffs to please the 
ootton men, our whole industrial and agricultural machinery 
"55 
would ory out against it. 
Another reason equally important was the faot that the war 
orders ot the Allies had oreated a time of great prosperity 
in the United States. A break with the Allies would endanger 
this large and profitable trade and might induoe a oommeroial 
criSis. The British Government was kept informed of this sit-
uation by its Ambassador at Washington. In one report to 
his superiors, he stated that : "The brutal facts are that this 
oountry has been saved by the war, and by our war demand, from 
a great oommercial orisis; that in normal times Great Britain 
and her colonies take forty per oent ot the total export trade 
of the United States. We have, therefore, the claims of their 
55 
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-best customer and, at the present moment our orders here are 
56 
absolutely essent1al to the1r econom1c prosperity." ~e-
ports suoh as this, undoubtedly, were a very important faotor 
in help1ng Great Britain to determine just how far resistanoe 
to American demands could be carr1ed without induc1ng retal1a-
tory measures. 
When American sympathy showed s1gns of becoming al1enated 
from the cause of the Al11es and ag1tat1on for an embargo in-
creased, Spring-R1ce sent another very s1gn1f1cant report to 
Grey. In appra1sing the possibilities of aotion by the 
United states, he stated: 
56 
57 
tiThe reason why there has been no embargo on arms 
and ammunition is not sympathy with us, but the 
sense that the prosperity of the country, on 
which the administration depends for its existenoe, 
would be imperilled by such a measure. If there 
is a scarcity of mater1al or any other reason why 
an embargo would pay, we should have an embargo. 
At present I don't see any ohance of it unless 
there is a change in the conditions. But lesser 
measures may be put into fDrce. Res~raints on 
shipping may be ordered. Transport may be impeded. 
A loan may be made more difficult. We are not se-
cure against such measures. Therefore, we must 
watch very oarefully what is oocurring here. Do 
not depend on official reports. But obtain inde-
pendent informat1on from as many sides as possible. 
The object should be to asoertain when the break-
ing point is near and where. There may be a 
breaking point. Do not deoeive yourself a s to 
that. If it aiproaches you may have to oonoede 
a point or two. 57 
GWynn, II, 300. 
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During 1916 relations between the United States and Great 
Britain became steadily worse. But each time that the·break-
ing point seemed imminent, Germany intervened to draw atten-
tion from the dispute in progress. A new crisis developed, 
however, with the publication on July 18 of a black list of 
American firms with which Allied firms were forbidden to 
58 
trade. This appeared to Wilson to be the last straw. . He 
informed House that his patience was exhausted and that he was 
considering asking Congress for authority to prohibit loans 
59 
and to restrict exportation of supplies to the Allies. This 
step was actually taken and before its adjournment in septem-
ber, two very significant measures were passed by Congress. 
In the first place, Congress conferred upon the President au-
thority to inaugurate an embargo upon munitions and other 
articles needed by the Allies. And secondly, a huge appro-
priation was made to provide for a vast ship-building program. 
This appropriationwas suffioient for the oonstruotion of one 
hundred thirty five vessels of all classes. With such an 
addition the navy of the United states would have been in a 
position to dispute with Great Britain for the command of the 
58 
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seas. House warned the president of the dangers that were 
inherent in such a program. Wilson's irritat10n with ~reat 
Britain 1s ev1denced by h1s reply: ttLet us bu1ld a navy b1g-
60 
ger than theirs and do What we please. 1t 
These weapons for enfo~cing respect for the neutral rights 
and the sovereign power of the United states were not, how-
ever, put into effect. Just at the time that the s1tuation 
between the United states and the Allies was apparently be-
coming intolerable, Germany injected into the war the element 
of unrestricted submar1ne warfare. As a result ot this pol-
icy of desperation the United states not only submerged her 
trade dispute with the Allies, but ult1mately espoused their 
cause and became an active part1cipant 1n the war. 
60 
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Chapter IV 
President Wilson's Attempts at Mediation 
All through the trying period of neutrality President Wil-
. 
son in his relations with both sets O~·~lligerentsShaped his 
foreign policy along two main lines. In the first place, his 
allegiance to the principles which form:d the cornerstone of 
the traditional foreign policy of the United states prompted 
him to use every effort to keep the country out of the Euro-
pean war. And secondly, his own devotion to humanitarian 
ideals incited in him the desire to direct his own energy and 
the power and influence of the United States to the task of 
bringing peace to the warring nations. 
Although attempting to carry out both policies simultane-
; 
ously, the methods employed in each ease were somewhat dis-
similar. In questions involving our rights as a sovereign 
power, the views of the President were generally conveyed to 
the belligerent Governments through the State Department. 
But his negotiations to bring about peace were of a more in-
formal nature and were conducted, for the most part, outside 
• 
of the regular diplomatic channels. The greater part of ~is 
work, which of necessity was of a very delicate and confiden-
tial nature, was entrusted by President Wilson to his closest 
friend, Colonel House, to whose Intimate Papers we must turn 
as our most imPortant source of informat1on. We cannot doubt 
that, 1:"1 h1s negot1at1ons w1th the representatives of t1!e bel-
11gerent Governments, House was express1ng the v1ews and de-
s1res of the Pres1dent. Wilson, h1mself, attests the bond be-
tween them and the s1m11arity of the1r sympath1es and ideals_ 
Having been asked whether House represented him accurately 1n 
a certa1n sltuat1on, he replied: "Mr. House 1s my second per-
sonality. He ls my 1ndependent self. Hls thoughts and. 
mlne are one. If I were in h1s place I would do just as he 
suggested ••• lf anyone thlnks he 1s reflecting my op1nion by 
"1 
whatever act10n he takes, they are welcome to the conclus1on. 
House was peculiarly fitted to carry out such a mlss10n by 
reason of his 11fetime 1nterest 1n fore1gn affalrs and his 
close assoclation with those in charge of our forelgn policy_ 
The Presldent had consulted h1m constantly 1n regard to ap-
pOintments to both the domestic and forelgn service and he was, 
therefore, thrown lnto close contact with the Am"bassadors to 
other countries. He was always deeply lnterested ln the1r 
problems and his cordlal relations With them expedlted the 
work that he was commissioned to undertake. H1s relations 
with the forelgn dlplomats stationed at Washington were always 
2 
on a fr1endly and sometimes even an intimate basls. Dur-
1 
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ing the course of the war he made a polnt of keeplng ln close 
touch wlth the Ambassadors of the belligerent powers. -In hls 
diary he said: III am laying plans to make myself grata. to all 
the nations lnvolved in this European War so that my services 
may be utl1lzed to advantage and without objection in the 
3 
event a proper opportunlty arrives. 
Unllke the President House was convinced that modern condl-
tions, whlch had made the United states a world power, demand-
ed the abandonment of the pollcy of isolation. Bound more 
closely, intellectually and commercially with Europe durlng 
the last thirty years than at any time in her h1story, she had 
incurred a.n obligation to actlvely particlpate in formulatlng 
plans for the maintenance of the peace of the world. But he 
also felt that any movement for lnternational cooperat10n must 
be based upon a close understanding between this country and 
Great Britain. Settlement of the difficult1es between them, 
which were baaed chiefly upon mislnformation and misunderstand-
lng on both Sides, was imperative. To accomplish this Presi-
dent W1lson and Colonel House employed a method which was 
unlque 1n diplomatic history- It was based on the ldea that 
foreign policy ·could be conducted like personal buslness QY a 
frank interchange 
4 
liness. In the 
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of views in a spirit of honesty and friend-
British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, 
House found a kindred spirit for whom he came to have a deep 
affection and unbounded respect. He considered him a !1plo-
mat distinguished by sincerity of purpose and honesty of meth-
od and one who did not regard diplomacy " ••• as a mysterious 
intTigue, but rather as a means by which the representatives 
of different states could discuss frankly the coinCidence or 
the clash of national interests and reach a peaceable under-
5 
standing." 
The efforts of President Wilson and House to insure peace 
in Europe really antedated the war. Alarmed by the growing 
tension between the nations of Europe, Wilson dispatched House, 
in May 1914, on a mission designed to bring about a better un-
derstanding between England and Germany. Negotiations to 
effect this end were, however, abruptly terminated by the 
events which culminated in the general European War. Immedi-
ately after the outb~ak of the war, Wilson sent to each of the 
belligerents a formal offer of mediation. This offer was 
merely an expression of his willingness to act in behalf of 
European peace at the moment or " ••• at any other time that 
6 
might be thought more suitable ••• " The replies of the belli-
gerent Governments were equally formal acknowledgements of the 
PreSident's offer of mediation and were productive of no re-
sults. 
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As a result of the many misunderstandings that developed 
over our trade during the first months of the war and tHe ap-
parent inability of Ambassador page to grasp the American 
point of view, ~ilson resqlved, early in 1915, to send House 
to England to explain the American attitude. A secondary 
purpose of this mission was to determine the possibilities of 
mediat1on. Informal conversations held by House with Spring-
Rice and Bernstorff had given rise to the faint hope that the 
time was ripe for an offer of mediation. That such an under-
taking would be complicated in both England and Germany by the 
strong anti-Amer1can sentiment which was developing, this Gov-
ernment was well aware. Grey wrote that, although it would 
give him great ple~sure to see and talk to House, it was most 
1mportant that he should be cognizant Of the state of public 
opinion in Engla.nd before embarking upon his mission. The 
policy of the United States Government of singling out Great 
Britain as the only Power whose conduct merited protest was, 
according to Grey,creating a very unfavorable impression on 
the people of England. Ambassador Gerard sent a similar re-
port from Germany. He said tha t German re sentment against 
American sales of munitions to the Allies was finding expression 
in a veritable campaign of hate d1rected against America and 
7 
Americans. 
Despite these disoouraging reports the undertaking was not 
7 
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abandoned. Wilson and House both felt that every opportunity 
which offered even the slightest chance to bring peace ehould 
be seized. House accordingly sailed for England on January 
30, 1915. He 1mmed1ately got in touch w1th Grey to whom he 
proposed a peace conference to negot1ate a peace based upon 
the evacuat10n and restoration of Belgium and a drast1c d1s-
armament program to ensure permanent peace. Grey signif1ed 
that peace upon these terms would be satisfactory to England 
but he feared that England's Allies would not accept a pro-
gram which did not take their territorial aspirations into con-
sidera tion. Grey also maintained that an essent1al element of 
a settlement must be some general guaranty for world-wide peace. 
British officials were inc11ned to be sceptical of the sincer-
ity of the Germans, fee11ng that their military success pre-
cluded the acceptance of any peace terms that would be satis-
factory to the Allies. This feeling was intensified by the 
German proclamation of February 4, in regard to the use of the 
submarine. 
House later visited Paris and Berlin where the fears ex-
pressed in England were confirmed. His conferences with Poin-
care and Delcasse, the Minister for. Foreign Affa1rs, convinced 
him that the basis of peace which he had discussed with Grey 
would not be acceptable to France. In regard to the territor-
ial ambitions of that nation he said: "The French not only want 
Alsace and Lorraine but so much more that the two countries are 
8 
not within sight of peaoe. 1t From Berlin, he wrote that he 
was sadly disappolnted that " ••• we were misled into belfeving 
that peaoe parleys might be begun upon a basis of evaouation 
9 
of Franoe and Belgium. 1t As a result of his vis1ts and oon-
ferenoes, House beoame oonvinoed that the U1vil Governments of 
eaoh of the bel11gerents would weloome peaoe but feared to be-
gin negotiations. Beoause of the strength of the military 
maohine and the intens1ty of feeling that had been developed 
among the people, any proposal of peaoe terms whioh did not 
s1gnify oomplete v1otory would have meant the downfall of 
those in power. Zimmerman, the ~erman Seoretary of state in 
oharge of Fore1gn Affairs, told House that peaoe parleys, upon 
any terms that would have any· ohanoe of aooeptanoe would mean 
10 
the overthrow of the Government and the Kaiser. House 
summed up his 1mpressions in a message to Bryan in whioh he 
stated: 
tlEverybody wants peaoe, but nobody is willing 
to oonoede enough to get it. They all also 
say that they desire a permanent settlement 
so that no suoh disaster may ooour hereafter, 
but aga1n there 1s suoh a divergenoe of ideaS" 
as to how th1s should be brought about that 
for the moment it is impossible to harmonize 
the differenoes. 
Germany is not willing to evaouate Belgium 
at all, nor even Franoe, without an indemnlty, 
and Count von Bernstorff's suggestlon that this 
oould be arranged was wlde afield. The Allles, 
of oourse, will not oonsent to anything less; 
and there the situatlon rests. 1t 11 
8Seymour, Intlmate Papers, I, 399. 
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Exoept to make it known that he held himself in readiness 
to act in the interests of peace at any time, President4Wilson 
made no further moves until late in the year 1915. By that 
time the position of the United States had become extremely 
preoarious. Beset on the one hand by Allied restrict10ns on 
our trade, and on the other by the menaoe of the German sub-
mar1nes, the ma1ntenance of neutrality became increas1ngly 
d1ff1cult. Moreover, W11son's preoccupat1on with domestic 
affa1rs, which had been a matter of such concern to House early 
in the Adm1nistration, was now giv1ng way to a conviction that 
the United States was dest1ned to playa very 1mportant part in 
the solution Of world problems. He was still determined to 
keep out of the war 1f poss1ble, but he was beg1nning to ques-
t10n whether such a course could be followed. In a speech de-
livered at Milwaukee on January 31, 1916, he p01nted out that 
the nations at war, who felt that they were strugg11ng for 
the1r lives and honor, were constantly impelled to do things 
wh10h were incons1stent with the rights of the United states 
and which led to serious misunderstandings and difficulties. 
In meeting these d1ff1cult1es, the Pres1dent stated, he WaS 
charged w1th a two-fold duty: "In the first place, I know you 
are depend1ng on me to keep.th1s nat10n out of war. So far I 
have done so, and I pledge you my word that, God helping me, I 
will if i~ is possible. But you have laid another duty upon 
me. You have bidden me see to it that noth1ng stains or 1m-
pairs the honor of the United states, and that is a matter not 
within my oontrol; that depends upon what others do, not upon 
what the Government of the United States does; there may:at any 
moment oome a time when I cannot preserve both the honor and 
12 
the peace of the United States.'t 
The complexities of the situation brought House to the oon-
clusion that some definite action by the United States was nec-
essary. He felt that the policy of drifting and attempting to 
settle our difficulties with first one and then another of the 
belligerents could only result in the loss of the friendship 
of the Allies and perhaps the ultimate victory of Germany. 
The procedure which he advocated was for the President to de-
mand a conference to negotiate peace upon the basis of complete 
restitution by Germany and tmll guananties against future wars. 
In case one side~efused such a conference, the United states 
would enter the war on the side of the other. As acceptance 
of these terms by an undefeated Germany was extremely problem-
atical, it virtually amounted to a proposal that the United 
States should aid the Allies to enforce terms that they prob-
ably could.not enforce themselves. 
House feared that President Wilson's desire to keep the 
country out of war would cause him to reject a plan which in-
volved direct intervention. This fear was somewhat allayed 
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,bY the President's assertion that he had never been sure ;bat 
thiS country should remain aloof from the conflict and if Ger-
many and militaristic ideas were to win, the oblisation of the 
13 
united states was greater than ever. 'rhus encouraged, 
House developed his idea and a few weeks later submitted it to 
the President. Alth.ough startled by a plan which might eas-
ily lead to active participation, Wilson agreed that House 
should begin an informal discussion with the Allies to deter-
alne their attitude toward a demand that hostilities cease. 
The success of the plan depended upon a complete understanding 
betwe~n England and the United states and this he set himself 
to 'bring a bout. Letters from Grey, in the autumn of 1915, 
had expressed his belief that the cessation of hostilities and, 
.till more important, the prevention ot future wars, could be 
.ecured only with the assistanoe of the United States. In 
one letter he inquired as to the willingness of the President 
to propose a League of Nations w1th power to proceed against 
any nat10n which violated treaties or internat10nal laws, or 
. 14 
refused to subm1t disputes to arbitrat1on. 
The reply to Grey's letter, drafted by House and approved 
Iy W11son, was an extremely s1gnif1oant document. It not only 
~.nly expressed sympathy w1th the cause of the Allies, but 
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definitely proposed intervention and indicated the method of 
procedure. In it House stated that, in his opinion, .' 
It ••• it would be a world-wide calamity if the 
war should continue to °a point where the Allies 
could not, with the help of the United States, 
bring about a peace along the lines you and I 
have so often discussed. What I want you to 
know is that, whenever you c.onaider the time is 
propitious for this intervention, I will propose 
it to the President. He may then desire me to 
go to Europe in order that a more intimate under-
standing as to proceduremay be had. 
It is in my mind that, afte~ conferring with 
your Government, I should proceed to Berlin and 
tell them that it was the President's purpose 
to intervene and stop this destructive war, pro-
vided the weight of the United states thrown on 
the Side that accepted our proposal could do it. 
I would not let Berlin know, of course, of 
any understanding with the Allies, but would 
rather lead them to think our proposal would be 
rejected by the Allies. This might induce Be~ 
lin to accept the proposal, but, if they did not 
do so, it would nevertheless be the purpose to 
intervene. If the Cent~l Powers were still ob-
durate, it would probably be necessary for us to join the Allies a.nd ferce the issue." 15 
The proposal was received by England with a noticeable lack 
of enthusiasm. This attitude was no doubt due to a number of 
reasons, only a few of which need be mentioned here. In the 
first place, Engla.nd interpreted American protests against re-
strictions on her trade as evidence of unfriendliness to the 
Allied cause. Then too, the ideas expressed in the note were 
such a radical departure from the long-established foreign ~ 
policy of the United States and from Wilson's own repeatedly 
expressed sentiments, that some doubt may bave been felt as to 
15 
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, 
whether this oountry would aotually enter the war. And, fi-
nally, the terms of peaoe proposed ooinoided only with ~he 
publioly expressed war aims of the Allies. Seoret agreements 
between the Allied Powers, in regard to territorial annexa-
tions, indemnities, and the politioal destruotion of the enemy, 
were not taken into oonsideration. Wilson and House were dis-
appOinted but not disoouraged by th~ indifferent reoeption 
given to their offer. They felt that a better understanding 
must be brought about and that this oould be best aooomplished 
by again sending House to Europe to sound out the sentiments 
of the belligerent Governments. 
In the meantime,. House kept in touch with the German Ambas-
sador. He told him of his t0rthooming trip and said that if 
Germany would consent to a plan of gene:ral disarmament, the 
President would demand a peace oonferenoe. He did not dis-
cuss with Demstorff the questions of territorial adjustment 
or indemnity as he felt that these problems were best left to 
the Allies.' In dealing with Germany he advised Wilson it was 
well to move ciroumspeotly, not permitting the German Govern-
ment to lead them into an attitude that would place them in a· 
16 
di'&8reeable position with the Allies. Bemstorfr forward-
ed the information received from House to his Government, 
stressing the desirability of h1s mtssion for the purpose of 
improving mutual relat1ons. Unaware of the proposals already 
16 
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made to Grey, he describecf1 House as being absolutely neutral, 
very discreet and trustworthy, and standing in the very·center 
17 
of the political situation in America. The German Foreign 
Secretary, von Jagow, .responded by requesting House to visit 
Germany first in order to discuss militarism as it applied to 
18 
tha t country. 
House did not accede to the request of von Jagow as he 
thought it advisable to proceed directly to London. He sailed 
on December 28, 1915, and upon his arrival in England immedi-
ately got in touch with the British statesmen. To allay 
doubts entertained by them as to the possibility of American 
cooperation, Wilson sent an historic message to House: "Would 
be glad if yOu would convey my assurance that I would be will-
ing and glad, when the opportunity comes, to cooperate in a 
policy seeking to bring about and maintain permanent peace a-
19 
mong civilized nations." During his stay in England House 
conferred with the Prime Minister and other members of the 
Cabinet. President Wilson's desire to aid in bringing the 
war to an end was laid before them, but no actionwwas taken. 
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Their slowness to act was deplored by House, who felt that de-
lay might be fatal to the success of the plan inasmuch~s the 
uncertain state of our relations with both sets of belliger-
ents was ~iable to culminate in a crisis at any time. He, 
therefore, determined to go to Berlin to sound out the atti-
tude of that Government toward a peace movement. 
In Berlin, House was received in a most friendly manner by 
the German officia.ls, but it soon beca.me evident that they 
would not consider a peace based upon the terms suggested by 
Wilson. Although both the Chancellor and the Foreign Secre-
tary expressed a desire for peace they repudiated the idea of 
a settlement which signified defeat for Ger~ny. Their real 
attitude toward the efforts of President Wilson to initiate a 
movement for a conference was disclosed a little later in mes-
sages to Bernstorff. Bethman Hollweg stated that the people 
of Germany felt that Wilson's policy conSistently favored Eng-
land. This impression was so marked than only some very 
definite action against England would convince them that he 
was sufficiently unbiased to offer his good offices in favor 
20 
of peace. The Foreign Secretary, von Jagow, likewise ,ex-
pressed the belief that little could be expected from If ••• one 
whose instincts are all in favor of the English pOint of view 
and who, in addition, is so naive a statesman as President 
Wilson." Any attempt to effect a peace based upon the 
20 
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status guo ~J he deemed absolutely unacceptable to Germany. 
He recognized, however, the possibility that a change o~'feel­
ing in England coupled with German refusal to conclude peace 
might induce the President to cooperate openly with the Allies. 
He instructed Bernstorff that, t'As soon a s Mr. Wilson IS media-
. 
, . ., 
tion plans threaten to assume a more concrete form and an in-
clination on the part of England to meet him begins to manifest 
itself, it will be the duty of your Exc111ency to prevent Pres-
ident Wilson from approaching us with a positive proposition to 
mediate. The chOice of the means to reach this result without 
endangering our relations to the United states I venture to 
leave to your Excellency's ability as a diplomat, since I am 
not able to form a complete estimation of the Situation from 
21 
here." 
After leaving Berlin, House proceeded to Paris where he set 
; 
himself to the task of creating a "good atmosphere." His pol-
icy up to this time had been to deal with the British with the 
greatest frankness but leave to them the task of dealing with 
.... 
the Allies. However, the extreme deliberateness manifested by 
the British in this matter, made him decide -to present the issue 
direotly to the heads of the French Government. He informed 
• 
Briand and Cambon that neither the President nor he felt ant 
fears for the safety of the United states but that their deep 
interest in the future of democratic prinoiples prompted them 
21 
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"(1 
to take their present course. He left them, according to his 
report to Wilson, with the final understanding that no .ovement 
for intervention would be made if the Allies were victorious 
during the spring and summer but if the tide of war went a-
gainst them or remained stationary, the United States would 
22 
intervene. 
Upon his return to England, House won the support of Grey 
to the plan of calling a peace conference, but no action could 
be taken without the consent of the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet. Several conferences with Lloyd George and a number 
of his colleagues were encouraging but not conclusive. After 
one such conference, Grey and House drew up a memorandum which 
outlined the action President Wilson would be prepared to take 
and the terms of the peace he would endeavor to secure. House 
took this memorandum with him to Washington and submitted it 
to the President for his approval. Only one change was made 
in the cabled confirmation. The original text was changed 
by the insertion of the word probably in the sentence which 
read: "Colonel House expressed the opin:ion that if such a con-
ference met, it would secure peace on terms not unfavourable 
to the Allies; and if it failed to secure peace, the United 
states would (probably) leave the Conference as a belligerent 
23 
on the side of the Allies if Germany was unreasonable." 
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The offer of the Pres1dent was not accepted at that or any 
subsequent t1me. Many reasons have been advanced for the 
fa11ure ot those in power to seize thls opportunity to brlng 
the confllct to an end. Grey haa stated that England t s Al-
lies were oonvinoed that the1r natlonal interests oould be 
served only by a deoisive defeat of Germany and they would re-
sent the proposal of any terms whioh oould not be interpreted 
as a viotory. Moreover, as both F~nce and Russla had suf-
fered mOre from the war than England, who still possessed re-
serves ot men and resources, he hesitated to reoommend Wilson's 
proposal tearing it might be interpreted as a weaken1ng ot ~~ 
lsh support. He, theretore, oommun10ated the substanoe of 
24 
the memorandum to Brland w1thout a reoommendat10n. 
Lloyd George, in hls Mem01rs, has attempted to tix respon-
s1b111ty tor tailure to oall a conterence, whioh he sald would 
have saved a whole year ot ruin, havoo, and destructlon. He 
advanoed three probable reasons_ The tirst was the reluotanoe 
of Slr Edward Grey to press the matter upon Franoe and exert 
pressure upon them tor acoeptance of the terms. The second 
probable reason was the insertion ot the none fatal word" ln 
the gentleman's agreement drawn up by House and Grey. He felt 
that the insertion ot the word, probably, changed the whole 
oharacter ot the ag~eement, whioh consequently gave no real 
assurance of Amer1can cooperatlon. But the real explanat1on, 
24 
~., II, 125. 
he oonclucl:>:ded, was that 11 ••• President Wilson was afraid of pub-
lio opinicoon in the U.S.A. and Sir Edward Grey was frightened 
25 
of our Allll.ies." 
The reft fusal of the Allies to avail themselves of the Pres-
ident's aaassistanoe seemed to House to oonstitute one of the 
26 
monumental..rl blunders of the war. The effeot upon Wilson, 
and to a l£lesser degree upon House, was to raise in their 
minds graVV"V8 doubts as to the sinoerity of the Allied States-
men. Sinonoe the beginning of the war Great Britain and 
Franoe hadCi protested that they were fighting to save civiliza-
tion from the threat of autocratio and militaristic domination. 
Nevertheleeess, they refused an opportunity to effeot a just and 
permanent peace, apparently hoping, by oontinuing the struggle, 
to eventua~lly crush their enemies. House foresaw that, in 
the event of Allied success, new and disturbing problems would 
be created.Ei. He noted in his diary; "A situation may arise, 
if the AllJlies defeat Germany, where they may attempt to be 
diotatoria.a.l in Europe and elsewhere. loan see quite olearly 
where they~ may ohange their views on militarism and navalism. 
It dependss entirely upon what nation uses it, whether it is 
27 
considered.Ei good or bad. II 
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Chapter V 
The End of Isolat1on 
The fa1lure of the Al11ed Governments to take advantage of 
his offer of med1ation was a bitter disappo1ntment to Pres1-
dent W1lson. Through Colonel House he notif1ed Grey that, 
unless peace negot1ations were soon inaugurated, the people of 
the United states would demand that the Government adopt the 
same vigorous attitude in regard to Allied v1olations of the1r 
,1 
neutral rights as had been adopted toward the Central Powers. 
So ser10us was the state of pub11c op1nion that, according to 
Lansing, only one th1ng saved our relations with Great Brita1n 
from becoming strained to the breaking point. This one factor, 
which alone sa~d the British from a most ser10us situat1on, 
was the stupid1ty displayed by the German Government in the con-
2 
duct of its submarine warfare. 
The submarine campaign against neutral vessels, wh1ch had 
abated somewhat after the German declaration of September 1, 
1915, was renewed 1n the spring of 1916. In February the Ger-
man and Austro-Hunsarian Governments announced that armed mer-
chant ships of the Al11es would henceforth be cons1dered as 
aUXiliary cruisers and that, be1ng in the nature of naval ves-
1 
Seymour, Intimate Papers, II, 286. 
2 
lanSing, War Memoirs, Ill. 
3 
sels, would be attacked Without warning. This was in effect 
an announcement of an unrestricted submarine war, inasm~h as 
neutral as well as belligerent ships would be liable to attack. 
The use by belligerents of neutral flags in dangerous waters . 
constituted a menace to all shipping. During the succeeding 
;;,. .'7 
weeks many ships in the vicinity of tne British Isles were tor-
pedoed. The most wanton of all these attacks was the sinking 
on March 24 of the unarmed channel pass~nger boat, the Sussex. 
As American lives had been lost the incident became a mat-
ter of concern to the American Government. Both Colonel House 
and Secretary lanSing were convinced that the time for writing 
notes had passed and urged the President to take some decisive 
action. They fe·lt that the only practicable course under the 
Circumstances was to break off diplomatic relations with Ger-4 
many. Wilson, however, was reluctant to adopt a course; 
which, he felt, would inevitably lead to war. Although his 
peace proposals had involved possible intervention against the 
belligerent who refused to negotiate upon the basis of reason-
able terms, he was loath to enter the war because of a quarrel 
with Germany over the submarine. The first· course, he thought, 
would be a means of bringing an early and just peace, whereas 
• 
to enter the conflict in defense of our own rights would no1r 
3 
4 
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LanSing, MemOirs, 135-6; and Seymour, Intimate Papers, II, 
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v 
only prolong the war, but lessen the influence of the United 
states in the peace conference. He accordingly refuse~ to 
send the note prepared b,y Lansing which recalled Ambassador 
Gerard. Instead he drafted a reply himself in which he re-
viewed all the facts in the submarine controversy and con-
cluded with the statement that: "Unless the Imperial Govern-
ment shall now immediately declare and effect an abandonment 
of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying 
vessels, the Governaent of the United states can have no 
choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire 
5 
altogether. It 
In its reply to this note, Germany acceded to the demands 
of the United states. Submarine warfare in the future would 
be confined to the fighting forces of the belligerents. Mer-
chant vessels would not be sunk without warning or Without 
saving human lives, unless they attempted to escape or offered 
6 
resistance. This pledge was kept by Germany for about e+ght 
months, during which tiae, as has been previously noted, our 
relations with Great Britain became increasingly tense. 
Before dispatching his Sussex note to Germany, the President 
had made another unsuccessful appeal to the Allies to accept 
his offer of mediation. His efforts in this d1rection, al-
though apparently fruitless, had one very important result. 
5 
Foreign Relations, 1916 Supplement, 233-4. 
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During the period of negotiation, his ideas in regard to the 
foreign policy of the United states were completely revelu-
tionized. His earlier conviction that the war was a purely 
European affair whose causes could not touch us, had, by May 
1916,· been replaced by the idea that: "We are participants 
whether we would or not of the life of the world, for the in-
terests of all nations are our own also. We are partners 
with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair 
7 
as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and Asia. tI 
The negotiations with Grey, perhaps the most moderate and 
disinterested of the Allied statesmen, had led him to embrace 
the idea of a world pact to provide a mutual guaranty of the 
political independence and territorial integrity for all na-
tions. Early in 1916 he had pledged to Great Britain his 
adherence to such a pact. He announced his policy to the 
American people in an address, on May 27, 1916, before the 
League to Enforce Peace. His intense desire to act as a me-
diator and to be instrumental in effecting a just and perman-
ent peace, had impelled him to give serious consideration to 
the basis upon which such a peace could be established. His 
plan, which he felt was in conformity with the American ideal, 
was based upon two fundamental principles: the right of every 
people to choose the sovereignt, under which they would live; 
and the right of small nations to the same respect for their 
7 
Baker and Dodd, IV, 185. 
soveriegnty and territorial integrity as was accorded to large 
.' and powerful states. In pledging the cooperation of the 
United states in any feasible associat1on of nat10ns to secure 
and guarantee these rights, Wilson expressed the conviction 
that he was acting in accordance with the wishes of the Ameri-
8 
can people. By this declaration, Wilson def1nitely aban-
doned the historic American policy of 1so1ation and accepted 
the idea of a League of Nations as the keynote of his foreign 
policy. 
During the summer and early fall of 1916, the PreSidential 
campaign was the matter of paramount interest in the United 
States. As was to be expected, problems growing out of the 
war became involved in the campaign issues-. Irritation a-
gainst England was increased by her unyielding attitude and 
the issuance of the blaok 11st. Relations with Germany, on 
the other hand, were comparatively smooth. The inst1tution 
of unrestricted U-boat warfare, whioh was a constant souroe of 
oontroversy in Germany, was withheld largely through the ef-
forts of Count Bernstorff. He oonsistently po1nted out to his 
Government that suoh a oourse could only result in the breaking 
off of relations and the entrance of the United States 1nto the 
war.9 
8 
Ibid., IV, 185. 
9 
The Correspondenoe between Bernstorff and the German Foreign 
Office, between June and September 1916, is contained 1n 
German Doouments, II, 978-85. 
Wilson accepted his re-election to the Presidency, after a 
campaign based on the slogan "He kept us out of war, It as an·' 
endorsement by the people of the United states of his policy 
of neutrality. Shortly after the election he, therefore, un-
dertook to inaugurate a new movement for peace. He suggested 
, . 
,:;. ..., 
sending a note to the belligerents demanding the cessation of 
the war. Unless this action was taken he felt we would inevi-
tably drift into war with Germany over therjubmarine issue. 
Warnings had been received from Ambassador Gerard that Germany 
intended to break her promise of May 4 and institute unre-
stricted submarine warfare unless peace came soon. Colonel 
House, upon being consulted, advised against the initiation of 
any movement in this direction without first obtaining the con~ 
sent of the Allies. He argued that any demand for a peace 
conference would be interpreted as a definitely antriendly act 
and as an effort on the part of the United States to avert a 
crisis over the submarine issue and also to save Germany from 
10 
the consequences of her disre~rd of international obligations. 
11 
Similar views were expressed by secretary Lansing_ 
President Wilson refused to accept the advice given but did 
mOdify his propo,al. Instead of demanding peace, his note 
sent to the belligerents on December 18 was an appeal to them ~ 
to state the terms upon which they would be willing to negoti-
10 
Seymour, Intimate papers, II, 390-1. 
11 
Lansing, MemOirs, 178. 
86 
12 
a.te. All hope of favorable results from this appeal wa.s 
I nullified, however, by the issuanoe on Deoember 12 of idVltio 
notes addressed by the Central Powers to the Entente Govern-
ments, expressing their willingness to enter a peaoe oonfer-
13 
enoe. Wilsonappreoiated the danger that the Allies might 
,feel that he was aoting in oollaboration with Germany but he 
" 
nevertheless determined to send his note. In it he expressed 
the hope that an interchange of views would disclose that the 
terms of the belligerents were not so irreoonoilable as had 
been feared. His statement that the war aims eXpressed by 
the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides were virtually 
the same was reoeived in England, aooording to Page, with 
14 , 
" ••• surprise and sorrowful oonsternation." 'The English, he 
stated, interpreted the President's remarks as plaoing the Al-
lies and the Central Powers on the same moral level. The 
British themselves felt that they were fighting a holy and de-
fensive war to save free government from military tyranny. 
The President's request was refused by both the Central 
powers and the Allies. GerDBny, although expressing her will-
ingness to begin negotiations, refused to make an announoement 
15 
of her war aims. The Allies refused on the grounds that 
12 
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only a sat1sfactory conclus1on of the war could br1ng a per-
manent peace. At the moment, they stated, 1t would be ~ope-
less to expect Germany to consent to the po11cy of reparat1on, 
rest1tut1on and gua rant1es, that would be necesaary to 1nsure 
16 
such a peace. 
The fa1lure of these peace moves prec1p1tated a cr1s1s 1n 
Germany. The d1sastrous effects of the Eng11sh block ade were 
becom1ng not1ceable and the C1v1l Government was cnnsequently 
forced to accede to the demands of the extreme mil1tarists. 
The1r prom1ses to br1ng a qu1ck end to the war by an unre-
str1cted submar1ne campa1gn were f1nally accepted by the Gov-
I 
ernment. Off1c1al notice of this dec1sion~'was forwarded to 
Bemstorff on January 19. He was 1nstructed to notify the 
Amer1can Government on t he evening of January 31 of the new 
po11cy. Bemstorff warned h1s Government that wap was 1nev-
1table 1f the contemplated course was pursued and adv1sed de-
. 17 
lay that the Pres1dent m1ght con~inue his efforts for peace. 
Th1s advice was not heeded, however, and on February 1, 1917, 
Germany began an unrestr1cted submarine war. 
The Pres1dent learned of the German act10n first through an 
Assoc1ated Press bullet1n. H1s react10n to the news has been 
descr1bed by Tumulty: "W1thout comment, It he sa1d, ttl la1d the 
fateful s11p of paper on his desk, and Silently watched h1m as 
16 
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he read and then re-read it. I seemed to read his mind in 
the expressions that racfl!!ed across his strong features: ~irst, 
blank amazement, then inc:::::redulity that eyen Germany could be 
guilty of such perfidy; ~hen gravity and sternness, a sudden 
grayness of oolour, a comapression of the lips and the familiar 
locking of the jaw which always characterized him in moments 
of supreme resolution. Handing the paper back to me, he said, 
in quiet tones, 'This meaLns war. The break that we have 
18 
tried so hard to prevent now seems inevitable.' tt 
Colonel House also testified to the bitter disappointment 
of President Wilson at th:_is sudden and unwarranted action of 
the German Government. LEe had placed great reliance on the 
hopes, extended by Bernst.orff, of securing definite peace pro-
posals from Berlin. Thi=s sudden reversal of poliey, when all 
19 
the talk was of peace, arooused in him an interise resentment. 
Moreover, the German annovuncement came at a time when the Pres-
ident was more than eyer ~onyinced that the United states 
should remain out of the ~ar. His earlier sympathy for the· 
Allied Cause and his cony~ctlon that the welfare of the world 
depended upon the defeat ~f Germany bad undergone a change dur-
ing 1916. The refusal o~ the Allies to accept his offer of 
mediation bad made him susspicious of their motives in forcing 
a continuance of the war. In addition he feared that Ameri-
18 
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19 
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can aSsIstance, if given, would be used merely for the attain-
ment of national ambitions by the Allied nations. Ano1her 
vital reason for his opposition to war was his convIction that 
he ruled by the Will of the people. His recent re-election 
he interpreted as a mandate from the people to keep them out of 
war. 
But despIte these considerations President Wilson did not 
delay action~ On February 3 he announced to Congress the 
20 
breaking off of relations with Germany. He expressed the 
hope that war might still be averted. He told Congress that 
only actual overt acts could convince him that Germany really 
Intended to carry out the threatened policy- overt acts, how-
ever, were not lacking and served the double purpose of con-
vincing the President that War was inevItable and of crystal-
lizing publIc opinion. The publication on February 26 of 
Zimmerman's telegram, Offering an alliance to Mexico with the 
promise that she could regain from the United States by con-
quest the territory lost at an earlier date, raised resentment 
in the United States to the highest pitch. T~ res~ts of 
this telegram were, according to LanSing, to transform popular 
indifference into intense hostility to Germany and to convert 
pacifism and a desire for continued inaction into demands for 
war. Public sentiment was unified against Germany and support 
20 
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21 
of the acts of the Executive was assured. 
The sinking by German submarines of a. number of Amer!6.an 
vessels seemed to make action by the United States imperative. 
The question of the nature of this action was submitt.ed by the 
President to his Cabinet at the regular meeting on March 20. 
The Cabinet was of the unanimous opin\8n that war was inevita-
ble and that Congress should be called in extraordinary session 
22 
as soon as possible. Lansing's note: on this momentous 
meeting are significant: 
"Thus ended a Cabinet meeting the influence of 
which may change the course of history and de-
termine the destin1es of the United states and 
possibly of the world. The possible results 
are almost inconceivably great. I am sure 
that every member of tbB Cabinet felt the vital 
importance of the occasion and spoke with a 
full rea11zation of the grave responsibility 
which rested upon him as he advised the Presi-
dent to adopt a course which if followed can 
only mean open and v1sorous war against the 
Kaiser and his government. The solemn1ty of 
the occasion as one after another spoke was 
increasingly impressive and showed in every 
mants face as he arose from the council table 
and prepared to leave the room." 23 
On April 2, 1917, President Wilson read to the jo1nt session 
of the two houses of Congress, the message which marked the 
abandonment by the United states of a principle which had been 
an integral part of her policy since the inception of the na-
... 
tion. It has been the purpose of this paper to trace the 
21 
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'.:I 
main steps by which this' decisionwas reached and to outline 
briefly some of the difficulties which beset the Preside~tts 
path. At the beginning of his executive career, Woodrow Wil-
son was devoted to the policy of isolation, Domestio reform 
was the keynote of his policy and foreign affairs received a 
scant share of his attention. Continued absorption, in dom-
estic matters was rendered impossible by the outbreak of the 
European War. The relation of the United States to the other 
nations of tile world now assumed new significance. Though 
striving outmrdly to maintain a strict impartiality, both by 
training and tradition his sympathy was with England. His 
a elmira tion ot the English system was eqlJt9.lled by his detesta-
tion of the autooraoy and militarism which, he felt, was char-
acteri stic of the German Government. 
Wilson's sympathy for England wa!! put to a severe test dur-
ing, the oourse of the war. In the beginning, the object of 
his diplomacy was the adoption of a policy which, while main-
taining the honor of the United states, would not hinder Eng-
I 
land's attainment of her national desires. England's deter-
mination, however, to let neither the rights of neutrals nor 
the observance of international law interfere with her policy, 
had the ulti~te effect of exhausting the patience of Pre~i­
dent Wilson and undermining his faith in their motives. 
The effect of England's naval policy upon Germany was the 
factor which ultimately determined the course of action in the 
-United states. The issue is succinctly stated by Kenworthy 
and Young who observed that: ft ••• one effect of the Brftish 
blockade was so to irritate Germany into so irritating America 
24 
that Britain could continually screw the Vise tighter." In 
the last analySis, therefore, the decision of Presldent Wilson 
was forced, neither by his own sympathies nor by the character 
of his intercourse with Great Britain, but by the ruthless 
character of German submarine warfare. Both nations had vio-
lated American rights repeatedly and grievously. But bal-
anced against British disregard for property rights, was Ger-
man dlsregard for human rights. This was the flnal factor 
that influenced Wilson's action. When he became cQnv1nced 
that he could not remain out of the war and still maintain the 
sovere1gn rights and the honor of the Unlted States, he took 
the eventful step that led to active part1cipation in the Euro-
pean War. 
24 
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